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Heightened Procedure 
Jessica Erickson*
ABSTRACT: When it comes to combating meritless litigation, how much 
should procedure matter? Conventional wisdom holds that procedure should 
be uniform, with the same rules applying in all civil cases. Yet the causes of 
meritless litigation are not uniform, making it difficult for identical 
procedures to address the problem. As a result, lawmakers frequently turn to 
what this Article calls “heightened procedure”—additional procedures 
applicable only in designated areas of the law. Across a variety of substantive 
areas, lawmakers have adopted heightened pleading standards, stays of 
discovery, agency review, and a multitude of other tools from the heightened 
procedural toolbox. Despite the prevalence of heightened procedure, there has 
been no comprehensive examination of its role across the legal system, leaving 
lawmakers with little understanding of what specific heightened procedures 
do and what specific areas of the law need. This Article aims to provide that 
framework, explaining how lawmakers can match the causes of meritless 
litigation with the appropriate heightened procedural tools. In the end, 
meritless litigation is not one-size-fits-all, and its procedural solutions should 
not be either. 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
In certain corners of the legal system, meritorious cases are like needles 
in a haystack—the problem is finding them. Meritless cases impose real costs 
on the legal system; they burden courts, inflict unnecessary expense on 
defendants, and give litigation a bad name. Yet, at the same time, meritorious 
cases confer real benefits; they hold wrongdoers accountable, deter future 
misconduct, and drive legal reform. If meritorious cases are worth finding, 
how should we go about finding them? 
In theory, procedure should help. Procedural rules help sort the good 
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cases from the bad, allowing meritorious claims to go forward while weeding 
out the meritless ones.1 Pleadings, discovery, motions for summary judgment, 
Rule 11 filings—these tools all help identify claims that are unlikely to succeed 
at trial. 
The problem is that procedural rules are transsubstantive—they apply in 
all civil cases.2 Yet the causes of meritless litigation are not one-size-fits-all. The 
challenges of prisoner litigation are different from the challenges of securities 
class actions, which are different still from the challenges of medical 
malpractice and patent cases.3 Different types of cases pose different types of 
challenges, which transsubstantive rules by their very nature cannot fix.4 
But what transsubstantive rules cannot fix, legislatures can (or so they 
think).5 In a variety of substantive areas, federal and state legislatures have 
used what this Article calls “heightened procedure”—additional procedures 
applicable in designated areas of the law to reduce meritless litigation. In 
securities class actions, for example, Congress has raised pleading standards 
 
 1.  See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. Pᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 519, 577 (1997) (“The 
goal of any regulatory scheme, whether it involves strict pleading, penalties or judicial screening, 
is, loosely stated, to minimize the problems of frivolous litigation without creating too many new 
problems along the way.”); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About 
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74 (1990) (discussing the “screening function” of summary 
judgment rules).  
 2.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings 
in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81.”); see also Paul D. Carrington, Making 
Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 2067, 2080–81 (1989) (“Generalism in civil procedure is, in the 
Anglo-American tradition, about a century older than the Federal Rules . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see 
also generally David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191 
(examining the rise of transsubstantive procedural rules). 
 3.  A number of eminent scholars have recognized the limits of transsubstantive rules. See, 
e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 536; 
Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on 
the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 370 (2013); see also generally Stephen N. 
Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural 
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1999 (1989). 
 4.  By describing procedural rules as transsubstantive, I do not mean to imply that 
procedural rules never vary across subject areas. There are a handful of Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that apply only in certain types of cases, such as the exemptions to the initial disclosure 
requirements in Rule 26(a) or the procedures in Rule 23.1 that are applicable only in 
shareholder derivative suits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), 23.1. Moreover, judges have limited 
discretion to alter the application of these rules in specific situations. See Steven S. Gensler, Judicial 
Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 700 (2010) (“The Civil Rules leave it 
to the individual judge to custom-fit the procedure to the case.”). These limited exceptions, 
however, do not change the broader commitment to transsubstantive procedures, making it 
difficult to address the problems in specific areas of the law.  
 5.  See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 416 (2010) (“Congress and state legislatures have embraced 
substance-specific procedural rules as tools functionally indistinct from substantive legal changes 
in order to achieve particular goals of public policy.”).  
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and limited access to discovery.6 In prison litigation cases, Congress has 
authorized limited cost-shifting and required inmates to exhaust 
administrative remedies before filing suit.7 And in patent litigation, Congress 
is currently considering whether to adopt heightened pleading standards, 
expand joinder rules, and authorize fee shifting.8 A number of state 
legislatures have joined in the fray, adopting additional procedural hurdles in 
medical malpractice and product liability cases.9 As these examples indicate, 
lawmakers often use heightened procedure to fix the problems that 
transsubstantive rules cannot. 
Despite the importance of heightened procedure, scholars have analyzed 
only pieces of this larger phenomenon. Some scholars have examined the role 
of heightened procedure in specific areas of law, from screening panels in 
medical malpractice cases10 to agency review in employment discrimination 
suits.11 Other scholars have examined specific heightened procedural tools, 
from fee-shifting statutes12 to pre-suit discovery13 to mandatory Rule 11 
inquiries.14 And more recently, there has been a legion of valuable articles 
examining heightened pleading requirements—but even this is just a single 
tool in the heightened procedural toolbox.15 Still lacking is a comprehensive 
 
 6.  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (2012). 
 7.  Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). 
 8.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b) (2012). 
 9.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.203 (West 2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-622 (West 
2013); N.C. R. CIV. P. 9(j) (West 2011). 
 10.  See, e.g., CATHERINE T. STRUVE, EXPERTISE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: 
SPECIAL COURTS, SCREENING PANELS, AND OTHER OPTIONS, PEW PROJECT ON MEDICAL LIABILITY 
52 (2003); see also generally Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model 
Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181 (1990); Mary Markle, Comment, How 
Affidavit of Merit Requirements Are Ruining Arizona’s Medical Liability System, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 407 
(2014). 
 11.  See generally Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment 
Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401 (2004); Ronald Turner, Thirty 
Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375 (1995).  
 12.  See generally Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 59 (2013); Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the Impact of 
Alaska’s English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 13.  See Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Presuit Discovery, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
43, 57 (2010); see also generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to Justice: 
The Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217 (2007) (discussing the 
limited role of pre-suit discovery in most jurisdictions). 
 14.  See generally M. Todd Henderson & William H.J. Hubbard, Judicial Noncompliance with 
Mandatory Procedural Rules Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S87 
(2015) (analyzing the requirement in the PSLRA that judges conduct a mandatory Rule 11 review 
in every securities class action). 
 15.  See generally, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court 
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009); Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the 
Future of Transsubstantive Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1189 (2010); Christopher M. Fairman, 
Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002); Alexander A. Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 
162 U. Pᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1767 (2014); A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response 
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examination into the role of heightened procedure across the legal system. 
This gap in the literature has consequences of its own. When Congress 
turned its attention to heightened procedure in securities class actions, for 
example, there was little debate about whether discovery stays or heightened 
pleading requirements were the right procedural tools for the problems in 
these complicated cases.16 Likewise, when Congress overhauled the rules 
governing prisoner litigation, it spent almost no time examining whether 
prison grievance systems would be effective in identifying meritorious 
claims.17 Even now, as Congress considers heightened procedure in patent 
litigation, it has failed to consider the interplay between the specific 
procedural reforms on the table and the problems it is trying to solve.18 In 
short, lawmakers are using heightened procedure, but without any 
overarching sense of what the specific tools in their procedural toolbox do, 
and what particular areas of law require. 
This Article aims to provide that overarching framework.19 A necessary 
part of that framework is understanding the three main causes of meritless 
litigation. The first cause is asymmetric information—plaintiffs in these cases do 
not have access to the information they need to evaluate the merits of their 
claims.20 The second cause is asymmetric cost—plaintiffs in these cases may 
suspect that their claims lack merit, but they file them anyway because the 
 
to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710 (2013); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010). 
 16.  The legislative history of the PSLRA is extensive, but includes almost no discussion of 
the merits of different procedural options. Congress did debate the possibility of including fee-
shifting rules in the PSLRA, but ultimately decided on mandatory Rule 11 inquiries instead. 
Otherwise, the discussion focused on the problems in securities class actions, not on which 
procedural tools were best able to solve these problems. See generally H. REP. No. 104-369 (Nov. 
28, 1995); S. REP. No. 104-98 (June 1, 1995). 
 17.  See, e.g., Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[I]t is worth 
noting that some believe that this legislation which has a far-reaching effect on prison conditions 
and prisoners’ rights deserved to have been the subject of significant debate. It was not.”); Susan 
N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 
OR. L. REV. 1229, 1277 (1998) (“The legislative process leading to the passage of the PLRA was 
characterized by haste and lack of any real debate [and therefore] the Act takes a scattershot 
approach to reducing the cost and volume of prison litigation in the federal courts.”).  
 18.  See Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PAT. PROGRESS, 
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-
reform-legislation (last visited Sept. 11, 2016) (summarizing the patent reform statutes introduced 
in the Senate and House of Representatives over the past several years).  
 19.  Some scholars may argue that Congress should never adopt heightened procedural 
rules and therefore that such a nuanced discussion is unnecessary. As explained in Part II, 
transsubstantive rules solve many problems, but create others, especially in areas involving 
information or cost asymmetries, and therefore it makes sense for Congress to adopt heightened 
procedures in these areas. Even those who may disagree with this premise, however, will likely 
acknowledge that, whether they like it or not, Congress has and will likely continue to adopt these 
rules. As a result, it makes sense for Congress to do so with a more developed understanding of 
when such rules are appropriate.  
 20.  See infra Part II.A. 
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defendants’ costs to litigate far exceed their own.21 Others have recognized 
these two main causes of meritless litigation, but a third explanation is vastly 
unappreciated in the literature. In this third category—which involves hybrid 
asymmetries of information and cost—plaintiffs do not have access to the 
information necessary to evaluate their claims, yet they can obtain a nuisance 
settlement regardless of this lack of information because it will cost the 
defendant more to litigate the case than to settle. 
This Article’s central claim is that heightened procedure can reduce 
meritless litigation, but only if lawmakers match the causes of meritless 
litigation with the right procedural tools. When the cause of meritless 
litigation is asymmetric information, lawmakers should adopt agency review 
or pre-suit discovery, but not heightened pleading requirements or fee 
shifting. Conversely, when the cause is asymmetric costs, heightened pleading 
requirements and fee shifting are appropriate procedural options, while pre-
suit discovery or mandatory sanctions are not. In hybrid asymmetry cases, the 
problem is more complex because reforms that reduce one type of asymmetry 
often exacerbate the other. Lawmakers should address this complexity by 
combining different procedural options, such as allowing plaintiffs to obtain 
limited pre-suit discovery at their own expense. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II provides an in-depth 
examination into the main causes of meritless litigation. Part III explores how 
legislators can ameliorate these causes by matching them with the appropriate 
heightened procedures. Part IV applies this analysis to three case studies— 
one where lawmakers used the right procedural tools, one where lawmakers 
used the wrong procedural tools, and one where they have not decided yet. 
These case studies offer an opportunity to bring the theoretical discussion 
from the prior Parts to bear on the use of heightened procedure in practice. 
II.     THE CAUSES OF MERITLESS LITIGATION 
Few things bring people together like the opportunity to rail against 
meritless litigation. On both sides of the aisle, politicians relish the 
opportunity to criticize those who file lawsuits with little hope of success.22 Yet 
 
 21.  See infra Part II.B. This category reflects what we commonly refer to as frivolous litigation. 
Frivolous litigation includes those cases in which “a plaintiff files suit knowing facts that decisively 
establish little or no chance of the defendant’s objective liability on the basis of any of the legal theories 
plaintiff alleges.” Bone, supra note 1, at 531. As explained below, many frivolous cases are filed because 
of cost asymmetries between the parties. In contrast, meritless litigation is a broader category, 
encompassing all cases in which “a court determines, after adversarial briefing or discovery, that a 
plaintiff’s theory of relief is insufficient or that a reasonable jury could not find facts that would allow a 
plaintiff to recover.” Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 
IND. L.J. 1191, 1203 (2014). My focus here is on areas of the law in which there is a disproportionate 
number of meritless cases, even if these cases are not obviously frivolous. 
 22.  See, e.g., Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement 
of John McCain, U.S. Senator from Arizona) (decrying “opportunistic lawyers [who] represent 
ambulance chasing at its worst”); Press Release, Congressman Lamar Smith, Smith Bill Combats 
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it has been far more difficult to agree on the causes of meritless litigation. 
Some scholars argue that meritless litigation is a result of information 
asymmetries.23 Others argue that it is a result of cost asymmetries.24 This Part 
argues that there is no single cause to the problem of meritless litigation. 
Some meritless cases are caused by information asymmetries, others are a 
result of cost asymmetries, and still others are caused by both information and 
cost asymmetries.25 These diverse roots in turn provide a foundation for the 
heightened procedural rules discussed in Part III. 
A. INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
As scholars have long recognized, many meritless cases are filed as a result 
of information asymmetries.26 Plaintiffs in these cases do not have access to 
the facts they need to evaluate the merits of their claims.27 As a result, some 
plaintiffs file suit hoping to use the discovery process to determine whether 
their claims have merit.28 In other words, part of the plaintiff’s motivation in 
filing suit is to uncover what really happened to them. 
Many employment discrimination cases fall into this category.29 Imagine, 
 
Lawsuit Abuse (July 11, 2013), http://lamarsmith.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/smith-
bill-combats-lawsuit-abuse (calling for mandatory sanctions on those who file frivolous lawsuits, 
claiming that “lawsuit abuse is common in America” and constitutes “legalized extortion”); FACT 
SHEET: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, WHITE HOUSE (June 4, 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-
tech-patent-issues (announcing executive action “designed to protect innovators from frivolous 
litigation”).  
 23.  See Bone, supra note 1, at 524 (“Frivolous litigation is most likely to occur under 
conditions of asymmetric information.”); Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 53, 74 (2010) (“[A] plaintiff confronted with information asymmetry faces a substantial ex 
ante uncertainty about his claims, and this uncertainty gives rise to significant error costs, either 
by the filing of a frivolous claim or by the inability to file a meritorious claim.”). 
 24.  See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 2, at 2088 (“That a system must inhibit the making of 
unfounded contentions is a function of the gross economic costs that disputants are otherwise 
able to impose on one another.”). 
 25.  There are also more idiosyncratic causes of meritless litigation. Some plaintiffs, for 
example, may be overconfident about the merits of their claims or willing to file a meritless claim 
out of spite. See generally Jane Goodman–Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to 
Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 133 (2010) (finding lawyers consistently 
overestimate their likelihood of success in trial and make strategic decisions based on those 
overconfident estimates). Such cases, however, are unlikely to be concentrated in particular areas 
of the law and thus are not addressed by heightened procedures targeting particular areas.  
 26.  See Bone, supra note 15, at 922 (“The key to explaining much of meritless litigation is 
to introduce asymmetric information about the merits at the pleading stage.”); Chris Guthrie, 
Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 175 (2000) (“[T]he 
asymmetric information models present a persuasive account of frivolous litigation.”). 
 27.  See Bone, supra note 15, at 922. 
 28.  See Bone, supra note 1, at 561 (explaining that “plaintiffs sometimes litigate through 
discovery to learn” whether their case has merit, especially in cases that turn on evidence that is 
difficult to obtain prior to filing). 
 29.  See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 13, at 67 (discussing asymmetric information problems in 
employment discrimination cases); Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric-Information Model of Litigation, 
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for example, a plaintiff who suspects that he was fired because of his age. 
Despite this suspicion, the plaintiff may not have concrete evidence to support 
it, nor any way to get such evidence before filing suit. As a result, he may file 
a lawsuit with the hope of uncovering such evidence during the discovery 
process. In some cases, this hope will turn out to be warranted, and the 
plaintiff will be able to substantiate his claims with documents or deposition 
testimony. In other cases, the plaintiff may discover that there was no 
discriminatory intent and that his initial claims were unsupported by the facts. 
In both cases, the plaintiff faces the same information asymmetry at the start 
of the case with no obvious way of determining whether the claims have merit 
before filing suit. 
Plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases can face a similar information 
deficit.30 Patients may know that they suffered an adverse medical event, but 
they may not know whether the cause was malpractice or simply bad luck. 
Patients do have access to their medical files,31 and some patients may find all 
the information they need to build their case in these files. In other cases, 
however, the information they need may lie in the heads of the doctors and 
nurses in the operating room. As a result, just like plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination suits, these plaintiffs may have to sue to gain access to the 
information they need to determine whether their claims have merit. 
In short, plaintiffs face an information asymmetry in any case in which 
the information they need to evaluate their claims rests within the control of 
the defendant. This discussion assumes that defendants have the information 
advantage in the litigation. The reverse is also possible, however, such as when 
plaintiffs have information about their damages that is not available to the 
defendants. This analysis focuses on information asymmetries that favor 
defendants because information asymmetries are generally “a much more 
formidable concern for plaintiffs than for defendants.”32 For these plaintiffs, 
the information they need may be in the defendant’s files, or it may be in the 
minds and recollections of the defendant or its employees. Given that it is 
defendants who are accused of misconduct, however, it is not unusual for the 
facts relating to such misconduct to lay within their control.33 
 
22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 153, 154 (2002) (“[A]symmetric-information models provide the better 
account of trial outcomes in . . . employment discrimination . . . and other areas of litigation 
where plaintiff win rates are consistently below 50 percent.”); Arthur R. Miller, Keynote Address, 
McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 465, 474 (2012) (arguing that 
employment discrimination cases “provide a useful example” of information asymmetries 
because “[o]ne of the first rules of [firing an employee] is don’t tell the employee why”). 
 30.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 31.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2016) (allowing individuals to obtain copies of their medical 
records, subject to certain limited exceptions).  
 32.  Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 45 (2010). 
 33.  See Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Question, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 115 (2009) 
(noting that “defendants in many circumstances do know more than plaintiffs about the facts 
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The rise of the Internet has given litigants a variety of options to reduce 
this asymmetry.34 Most companies trumpet their business activities on their 
websites, as well as their Facebook and Twitter accounts.35 Public companies 
are required under the federal securities laws to file quarterly and annual 
reports detailing their financial results and business risks, and these reports 
are easily accessible online.36 Plaintiffs can even use the Internet to track down 
the defendant’s current or former employee or other individuals who may be 
willing to give them the inside information they need to corroborate their 
claims, as has become common in certain types of class actions.37 
Yet, although the Internet has brought a significant amount of 
information into the public realm, much remains behind closed doors. 
Plaintiffs do not have access to information that exists inside someone’s head, 
such as an employer’s motive for firing an employee. Nor can a plaintiff 
reliably obtain information about events that occur in private, such as in an 
operating room. To the extent that some types of litigation depend on such 
information, the Internet has only solved part of the problem. 
Litigants therefore face a choice. They can opt not to file their lawsuit, 
deciding that they are not willing to gamble on factually uncertain claims. Or 
they can file despite this uncertainty, hoping to uncover the facts they need 
during the discovery process. In cases involving an information asymmetry, 
there is no other choice. Plaintiffs must either abandon claims that may well 
be meritorious, or they must file claims that lack factual support at the time 
of filing. Given this choice, it is not surprising that at least some plaintiffs 
choose to file. Nor is it surprising that some of these claims later turn out to 
be meritless. 
If the claims are truly meritless, however, it is fair to ask why defendants 
do not simply share exculpating evidence with plaintiffs. In most of these 
cases, the defendants have the information that the plaintiffs lack. The 
defendants know why the plaintiff was fired or what really happened in the 
operating room. They could therefore eliminate the information 
asymmetries—and potentially avoid a lawsuit—by voluntarily turning over 
 
relevant to the claim” because “[i]t is the defendant, after all, who is accused of wrongdoing”). 
 34.  See, e.g., Colin T. Reardon, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2170,  
2171–72 (2010) (“Search costs for information are lower because of new technologies like the 
Internet. Equally important, the modern regulatory state has taken an active role in promoting 
the dissemination of information. Laws forcing or facilitating the disclosure of once-private 
information have proliferated in recent decades.”). 
 35.  See Wells M. Engledow, Handicapping the Corporate Law Race, 28 J. CORP. L. 143, 157 
(2002) (stating that there is an “endless amount of information that is available via the 
Internet . . . (typically free of charge on a company’s webpage), including: historical stock price 
trends, SEC and stock exchange filings, and press releases”). 
 36.  See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 340–41 (5th ed., 2006).  
 37.  See Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J. CORP. L. 551, 552 (2011) 
(“The use of confidential witnesses in class action securities litigation has become ubiquitous in the 
years since Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.”). 
A2_ERICKSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2016  8:26 PM 
70 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:61 
evidence that shows that they are not liable. 
One explanation is that many defendants face strategic reasons not to 
share evidence that disproves the plaintiff’s claims.38 Defendants want 
plaintiffs to know when their claims lack merit, but just as crucially, they do 
not want plaintiffs to know when their claims have merit.39 If a defendant 
turned over evidence to a plaintiff in one case to show that the plaintiff’s 
claims lacked merit, but then did not do so in another case, the plaintiff in 
the second case could logically infer that their case had merit and therefore 
demand a higher settlement. This rationale explains why defendants, 
especially those who are repeat players, can be reluctant to put their cards on 
the table, even when they know a claim is meritless. 
In addition to signaling concerns, even defendants who are not repeat 
players may be unable to convince a plaintiff that a claim is meritless. In many 
cases, for example, the plaintiff is looking for a smoking gun—for example, 
an email confirming that the plaintiff was indeed fired because of his age. Or 
the plaintiff may be looking for evidence showing a pattern of discrimination 
or other unlawful conduct. A defendant cannot easily prove that such 
evidence does not exist, at least not without turning over all of its files and 
allowing all of the relevant employees to be deposed, which it understandably 
will be reluctant to do.40 
In sum, some meritless cases are filed by plaintiffs who do not have access 
to the information they need to assess the merits of their case before filing 
suit. And defendants may be reluctant or unable to credibly share exculpating 
information with these plaintiffs. As a result, some plaintiffs file suit at least in 
part to find out what really happened to them. As we will see, this is a very 
different motivation than the incentive behind the filing of cost asymmetric 
cases. 
B. COST ASYMMETRIES 
In a second category of cases, the asymmetries concern costs, not 
information. In cost asymmetric cases, both sides know or strongly suspect 
that the case lacks merit. Yet the plaintiff files the case anyway because he 
knows that the defendant’s costs to litigate the case far exceed his or her own. 
As a result, it will be cheaper for the defendant to settle than to defend against 
 
 38.  See Bone, supra note 1, at 552 (“Defendants want plaintiffs to know the truth when their suit 
is meritless, but not when their suit is meritorious. Thus, defendants in meritorious cases try to deceive 
plaintiffs by pooling, that is, by making the same offer they would make if the suit was meritless.”). 
 39.  See generally Alon Klement, Threats to Sue and Cost Divisibility Under Asymmetric Information, 
23 INT’L REV. L & ECON. 261 (2003).  
 40.  To take this point one step further, the defendant may have control over the relevant 
information, but may not have easy access to it. Even if the relevant information is somewhere in the 
defendants’ files, it may be extremely costly and time-intensive for the defendant to locate it, especially 
if the defendant is a large organization with multiple offices and/or thousands of employees.  
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the claims.41 
Many merger cases fall into this category. In 2014, shareholders 
challenged approximately 93% of large mergers and acquisitions.42 
Shareholders in these cases typically alleged that the directors who approved 
these transactions breached their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose 
material information to shareholders or by failing to negotiate for a higher 
price.43 Some of these lawsuits likely had merit, but it is hard to believe that 
corporate directors breached their fiduciary duties in nearly every major deal 
over this twelve-month period. 
Meritorious or not, however, these cases are profitable for plaintiffs’ 
lawyers for at least two reasons, both having to do with cost asymmetries. First, 
it is relatively inexpensive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to file many of these cases. 
The complaints tend to be fairly cookie-cutter, and they are often filed within 
hours of the merger announcement.44 Second, almost all discovery is in the 
hands of the defendants. The plaintiffs are shareholders who typically have 
information about their own investment in the company, but no other 
information relevant to the underlying allegations. Given that each party pays 
its own discovery costs, plaintiffs can file cases relatively inexpensively and 
then serve extensive discovery requests on the defendant. Even more 
importantly, the plaintiff can threaten to seek an injunction delaying the close 
of the merger, exponentially increasing the defendants’ costs related to the 
litigation.45 Faced with these cost asymmetries, it is often cheaper to pay a few 
hundred thousand dollars to settle the case¸ even if the defendant does not 
think that the case has merit. Indeed, as one New York judge recently stated, 
“[n]o one, not even plaintiffs, disputes [the] reality[] [that] [t]he defendant 
corporation’s cost-benefit calculus almost always leads the company to 
 
 41.  See, e.g., William H. Wagener, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee-Shifting on Discovery Abuse 
in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1902–03 (2003) (“If a plaintiff credibly can 
threaten to pursue a trial that will prove disproportionately costly to the defendant, a defendant 
may be willing to settle even a suit known to be meritless by both parties to avoid the legal costs 
of fighting the suit.”). 
 42.  See OLGA KOUMRIAN, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC 
COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2014 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2015), https://www.cornerstone.com/Get 
Attachment/897c61ef-bfde-46e6-a2b8-5f94906c6ee2/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-
2014-Review.pdf. 
 43.  See Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical 
Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 563–64 (2015) (“State court merger 
litigation is premised upon the traditional fiduciary duties that target-company officers and 
directors owe to the company’s shareholders in connection with an acquisition, merger, or other 
business combination.” (footnote omitted)). 
 44.  See, e.g., Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the 
Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 155 (2011) (discussing legal rules that create 
incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys “to quickly file cookie-cutter complaints”). 
 45.  See Jill E. Fisch et al., supra note 43, at 565 (“Because claims that are not resolved on 
motions or settled prior to closing can theoretically be litigated long after closing, creating a 
potentially significant contingent liability, defendants have a strong incentive to resolve merger 
claims before the merger closes.”). 
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settle.”46 
Not all defendants will make the choice to settle under these 
circumstances. A repeat player may decide to defend against the claim to ward 
off similar claims by other plaintiffs in the future.47 This strategy will cost the 
defendant more money in the short run, but may be cost-effective in the long-
run. Similarly, a defendant may choose to fight a meritless claim to make a 
moral stand that he or she will not give in to extortionate demands. Such a 
defendant would be making an economically irrational decision in order to 
make a moral point. Rational defendants who are not repeat players, however, 
face strong economic incentives to settle for any amount less than the 
expected defense costs, even if they feel confident about their chances of 
success at trial. 
This category of cases is often in the minds of legislators when they decry 
frivolous litigation. In 1995, for example, Congress justified sweeping changes 
to securities class actions on the ground that “the abuse of the discovery 
process to impose costs [on defendants in these cases] is so burdensome that 
it is often economical for the victimized party to settle.”48 More recently, 
Congress raised the same concerns regarding patent litigation, citing 
concerns that “too many specious claims or defenses are filed solely for the 
purpose of forcing an unjust settlement, typically at a cost that is less than the 
cost of successfully completing the litigation.”49 And legislators are not the 
only ones to bemoan the economic incentives of cost asymmetric cases. In Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court justified heightened pleading 
standards for all federal claims on the ground that “a district court must retain 
the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a 
potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.”50 
To be fair, the vast majority of cases do not involve voluminous discovery 
or significant cost asymmetries. Multiple studies have found that the cost of 
discovery in most cases is fairly minimal. For example, a study by the Federal 
Judicial Center found that the median discovery costs for plaintiffs were 
$15,000, while the median discovery costs for defendants in these same cases 
were $20,000.51 These costs are far lower than the lore that dominates policy 
 
 46.  See Decision & Order, City Trading Fund v. Nye, No. 651668/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 
20, 2014). 
 47.  See Bone, supra note 1, at 540 (“By litigating instead of settling the first few frivolous 
suits, a repeat-player defendant can build a reputation for fighting. Once established, this 
reputation will signal other frivolous plaintiffs not to expect a settlement, and so they will not 
sue.” (footnote omitted)); Stancil, supra note 33, at 132 (arguing that the risk of nuisance 
settlements increases in claims in which the plaintiff’s attorneys are unlikely to be repeat players 
in the same court or against the same insurer/payer). 
 48.  H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).  
 49.  H.R. REP. No. 113-279, at 19 (2013). 
 50.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 558 (2007).  
 51.  See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: 
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1–2 
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debates would suggest.52 Moreover, even where discovery is voluminous, its 
burdens may fall roughly evenly on both sides. In most cases, therefore, there 
is not a significant cost asymmetry, either because discovery costs are relatively 
small, or fall evenly on both parties. As a result, there is no basis for sweeping 
transsubstantive rules to address concerns about cost asymmetries because the 
problem itself is likely not transsubstantive. 
In some types of cases, however, the cost asymmetry is substantial. These 
cases tend to share two key characteristics. First, the defendants in these cases 
typically have possession of the vast majority of the documents relevant to the 
case.53 These claims often turn almost entirely on the defendant’s conduct, 
making the defendant’s record of key importance in the case.54 Second, in 
cost-asymmetric cases, it is often difficult and therefore costly for the 
defendant to identify the relevant documents. In a case that turns on a single 
transaction or event, defendants can pinpoint the key custodians and identify 
the relevant documents fairly easily. In cases in which the allegations sweep 
more broadly, however, the defendant will have to search through far more 
records and interview far more employees to identify the relevant 
information.55 The necessity of such a broad review increases the defendant’s 
discovery costs, as well as the corresponding incentives to enter into a 
nuisance settlement.56 
Putting these factors together, cost asymmetric cases rest on the plaintiff’s 
ability to demand expansive, one-sided discovery from the defendant. 
Whether a case makes it to discovery is thus of great import. Professor Robert 
Bone has argued that defendants should be able to settle cost-asymmetric 
lawsuits for small nuisance payments because a patently frivolous case will 
never get to discovery. For cases that are frivolous on their face and thus will 
 
(2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/fjc-national-case-based-civil-rules-survey. 
 52.  See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and 
the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1994) (arguing that “the 
massive discovery reform agenda” in the political branches of government “is based on questionable 
social science, ‘cosmic anecdote,’ and pervasive, media-perpetuated myths” (footnote omitted)). 
 53.  See Stancil, supra note 33, at 124 (“Intuition, common sense, and the available data 
suggest that most pretrial costs are either roughly equal as to plaintiffs and defendants, or that 
they favor defendants rather than plaintiffs.”). 
 54.  See id. at 127 (“[C]laims in which the plaintiff’s internal pretrial costs are low tend to 
be claims for which there will be little inquiry into the plaintiff’s activities or damages.”). 
 55.  See id. at 130 (“[T]he cases with the largest internal defense costs tend to be those  
(1) in which the scope and depth of genuinely discoverable information under Rule 26(b)(2) is 
significant, and (2) without an obvious factual transaction around which to limit discovery.”). 
 56.  This cost asymmetry may be exacerbated by an asymmetry of risk between the parties. 
Studies have found that a plaintiff who has a low chance of winning will be risk seeking, while a 
defendant who has a low chance of losing will be risk averse. This analysis helps explain why even 
defendants who feel fairly confident that they will win at trial may settle to avoid even a small 
possibility of having to pay a large judgment. See Guthrie, supra note 26, at 168 (arguing that “the 
decision frame in frivolous litigation induces risk-seeking behavior in plaintiffs and risk-averse 
behavior in defendants”). 
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be dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, this point is undoubtedly true. There 
are some costs associated with filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but 
these costs rarely amount to millions of dollars. And any small amounts that 
defendants are willing to pay to make a case go away at these early stages are 
unlikely to draw legislative attention.57 
It is possible, however, for even a meritless case to survive a motion to 
dismiss. A motion to dismiss is limited to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ 
allegations.58 So as long as the plaintiff can allege a plausible claim, the 
defendant will be unable to get the case dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. 
And, once the case survives a motion to dismiss, the next opportunity for 
dismissal typically does not come until summary judgment, which occurs in 
most cases after the parties have completed discovery and incurred the 
associated costs.59 These economic concerns explain why the motion to 
dismiss takes on such importance in high-stakes cases, and why defendants are 
often willing to settle for substantial amounts if the case survives this hurdle. 
In short, there are cases in which economically rational plaintiffs will file 
claims that they know have little merit and economically rational defendants 
will pay to settle them. These cases tend to be in areas in which litigation costs 
fall disproportionately on the defendants, especially if the defendants are not 
repeat players and the cases are not easily dismissed at the pleadings stage. 
C. HYBRID ASYMMETRIES 
The analysis thus far has set up a dichotomy of meritless litigation. 
Plaintiffs file meritless cases because of either an information asymmetry or a 
cost asymmetry. These two types of cases are frequently discussed in the law-
and-economics literature, with scholars debating which cause is more 
prevalent.60 Largely missing from this literature, however, is a recognition that 
cases can have both an information and a cost asymmetry—a third category of 
meritless litigation that requires unique procedural solutions. 
In these hybrid cases, plaintiffs do not have access to the information they 
need to evaluate fully the merits of their claim. They can, however, obtain a 
nuisance settlement regardless of this lack of information because it will cost 
the defendant more to litigate the case than to settle it. 
 
 57.  Cf. Bone, supra note 1, at 541 (“[C]omplete information models do not provide a 
convincing explanation for why frivolous suits are problematic, at least not an explanation that 
justifies costly regulatory intervention.”).  
 58.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 59.  See, e.g., Stancil, supra note 33, at 108 (“A defendant faced with even the most ridiculous 
imaginable substantive claim—assuming it is properly pleaded—cannot typically move for 
summary judgment until there has been adequate time for discovery.”). Either side may file a 
motion for summary judgment on particular issues before significant discovery has occurred, but 
the nonmoving party can defeat the motion by showing that it needs additional discovery to 
respond properly to the motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), (d).  
 60.  See, e.g., Guthrie, supra note 26, at 170–76 (2000) (explaining the different theories of 
meritless litigation).  
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Securities class actions exemplify these characteristics. First, securities 
class actions often involve a cost asymmetry.61 The central questions in these 
cases are whether the targeted corporation made false statements to the 
investing public, and whether the corporation’s top executives knew these 
statements were false at the time the statements were made. The defendants 
in these cases have almost all of the information relevant to these issues, 
including internal e-mails and other correspondence.62 The plaintiffs, in 
contrast, tend to have few documents relevant to the case.63 Typically 
shareholders who purchased shares in the defendant corporation, these 
plaintiffs may have documentation relating to their individual investments, 
but they are unlikely to have other information relevant to the claims, 
including specific facts to support the falsity of the public statements or the 
defendants’ knowledge of this falsity. 
Moreover, the claims in these cases tend to be sweeping, often 
encompassing entire product lines or business areas.64 Specifically, many 
securities class actions challenge virtually all of a company’s public filings 
during the class period, alleging that these filings are all false and misleading. 
As a result, a vast number of documents may fall within the scope of discovery, 
making it difficult and expensive for the defendants to identify the relevant 
documents. 
A recent securities class action filed against Fiat Chrysler Automobiles 
illustrates this point.65 In a complaint filed on September 11, 2015, the 
shareholder plaintiff alleged that Fiat Chrysler failed to disclose flaws in its 
manufacturing processes that rendered millions of Chrysler cars and trucks 
unsafe to drive.66 According to the plaintiff, Chrysler also failed to disclose its 
 
 61.  See Stancil, supra note 33, at 130 (explaining why securities class actions often involve 
cost asymmetries).  
 62.  See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?: A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN L. REV. 497, 549 (1991) (“Since discovery in securities class actions is almost 
completely one-sided, plaintiffs[’ attorneys] control the discovery agenda.” (footnote omitted)); 
Patrick M. Garry et al., The Irrationality of Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits: A Proposal for Reform, 49 
S.D. L. REV. 275, 283 (2004)(“Trying to produce all documents pertaining to the knowledge of 
corporate management over a period of years can be ‘a massive undertaking.’” (footnote 
omitted) (quoting A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with 
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 953 (1999))). 
 63.  See, e.g., Martin Cunniff, Integrating All Aspects of Securities Litigation in a Challenging and 
Shifting Environment, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION (2012), 2012 WL 
1197180, at *6. (describing discovery in securities class actions as a “one-sided process, since the 
class representative plaintiffs usually have very little in the way of documents to produce”); Stancil, 
supra note 33, at 127 (explaining that a securities class action is the “paradigmatic case” in which 
there is “little inquiry into the plaintiff’s activities or damages”). 
 64.  See Stancil, supra note 33, at 130 (explaining the sweeping allegations in many fraud 
actions).  
 65.  See generally Pirnik v. Fiat Chrysler Autos. N.V., No. 1:15-cv-07199 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 
2015) (Stan. L. Sch. Secs. Class Action Database).  
 66.  See Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, Pirnik, No.1:15-
cv-07199, at ¶ 4. 
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allegedly slow completion rates for recalls and other improper actions by 
dealers in responding to recall notices.67 To support its claims, the plaintiff 
pointed to a $105 million fine imposed by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration in connection with the Company’s handling of 23 previous 
recalls affecting more than 11 million vehicles.68 
Although this case is still in its early stages,69 it will be no easy task for 
Chrysler to identify all of the documents relevant to the plaintiff’s allegations. 
There is not a short list of keywords that it can use to pull up all documents 
that relate to the alleged flaws in the manufacturing processes for 11 million 
vehicles. Nor is there likely to be a discrete subset of documents showing the 
effectiveness of the company’s 23 prior recalls. These documents are instead 
likely spread throughout the company in the electronic and written files of 
dozens, if not hundreds, of employees. As a result, while the plaintiff may only 
have to locate a few pages from his investment records, the defendant will 
have to spend millions of dollars to conduct a sweeping search of its own 
documents. 
Yet the plaintiffs in securities class actions also often suffer from an 
information asymmetry, as the Pirnik case itself demonstrates. The plaintiff in 
the Pirnik litigation must allege in his complaint why each challenged 
statement was false or misleading. He must also allege facts showing that 
Chrysler’s top officers knew that the statements were false at the time they 
were made. In other words, the plaintiff must be able to allege specific facts 
regarding: (1) the flaws in Chrysler’s manufacturing processes; (2) how these 
flaws made Chrysler’s public statements false and/or misleading; and (3) the 
knowledge of Chrysler’s top executives regarding the falsity of these 
statements. Yet the plaintiff is unable to obtain discovery on any of these 
points before surviving a motion to dismiss. 
Hybrid cases are not limited to securities class actions. The allegations in 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court’s case that raised pleading 
standards in all federal civil cases, typify the hybrid nature of many complex 
cases.70 The plaintiff in Twombly alleged a far-reaching conspiracy among 
several regional Bell companies to divide the national market for local 
telephone and high-speed Internet services.71 From the defendants’ 
perspective, it likely would be difficult to identify a list of keywords that would 
identify such a conspiracy. Nor was there an obvious list of employees who 
may have been involved in such a conspiracy. As a result, to prove that such a 
conspiracy did not exist, the defendants would have to search through 
millions of emails, memos, and other corporate records created by hundreds, 
 
 67.  See id.  
 68.  See id. at ¶ 9. 
 69.  See generally id. 
 70.  See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 71.  See id. at 550. 
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if not thousands, of employees. Given the discovery costs facing the 
defendants, it is understandable that the Court was concerned about allowing 
the case to proceed to discovery.72 
On the other hand, it likely was impossible for the plaintiffs to get the 
information necessary to support their claims except through the formal 
discovery process. The plaintiffs alleged that the regional Bell companies had 
entered into an illegal agreement to divide the market for telephone service. 
This agreement, if it in fact existed, would have been made behind closed 
doors, far from the public eye. Absent serendipitous help from an employee 
whistleblower or government investigation, the plaintiff would have had no 
way to obtain concrete evidence of such an agreement without formal 
discovery. 
The example of securities class actions, and the Pirnik and Twombly cases 
more specifically, demonstrate why information and cost asymmetries often 
arise together. In cases in which plaintiffs do not have access to the 
information they need to evaluate their claims, this information will often rest 
in the hands of the defendant. Locating and producing it, however, can be 
costly, and these costs will fall largely on defendants because they have the 
majority of the information. The plaintiffs’ lack of information, in other 
words, results in defendants facing a cost asymmetry to produce the relevant 
information. 
As the above analysis indicates, there are three distinct categories of 
meritless lawsuits: information-asymmetric cases, cost-asymmetric cases, and 
hybrid information/cost-asymmetric cases. And, as we will now see, each 
category requires unique procedural solutions, carving out a previously 
unexplored role for heightened procedural rules. 
III.     HEIGHTENED PROCEDURE AS A RESPONSE TO MERITLESS LITIGATION 
Meritless litigation is not one-size-fits-all, and its procedural solutions 
should not be either. This Part explains how lawmakers can use heightened 
procedural rules to address the different causes of meritless litigation. It first 
describes the appropriate tools to deal with information asymmetries and 
then sets out a very different set of tools to address cost asymmetries. Finally, 
it explains how lawmakers can combine heightened procedural tools to 
address the cost and information asymmetries present in hybrid cases. 
 
 
 72.  See id. at 559 (“That potential expense is obvious enough in the present case: plaintiffs 
represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to local telephone or high-speed 
Internet service in the continental United States, in an action against America’s largest 
telecommunications firms (with many thousands of employees generating reams and gigabytes 
of business records) for unspecified (if any) instances of antitrust violations that allegedly 
occurred over a period of seven years.”). It is less understandable why the court assumed that a 
similar cost asymmetry exists in civil cases across the board, thus justifying the sweeping change 
to federal pleading standards.  
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A. REDUCING INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
When legislators enact procedural changes to the law, they often draw 
from a familiar menu of options, with heightened pleading standards, fee 
shifting, and stays of discovery topping the list.73 These options, however, are 
particularly ill-suited for information asymmetric cases. Instead, these cases 
are best addressed by less common procedural tools that provide plaintiffs 
with an opportunity to obtain relevant information about their claims before 
they file suit. This Subpart explains how these tools can remedy information 
asymmetries and then explores how other, more commonly used procedural 
tools do not offer the same benefits. 
1. Effective Procedural Tools 
If lawmakers want to address the information asymmetry in certain types 
of litigation, they should adopt procedural tools that give plaintiffs more 
information about their claims at the start of the lawsuit. This Subpart 
discusses two such tools—pre-suit discovery and agency review. 
i.     Pre-Suit Discovery 
Few jurisdictions in the United States allow pre-suit discovery.74 Instead, 
plaintiffs must generally rely on their own knowledge and investigation to 
draft their complaint.75 Absent exceptional circumstances, plaintiffs do not 
get access to the defendant’s files and testimony until later in the litigation.76 
These rules make it difficult for plaintiffs facing an information asymmetry to 
survive a motion to dismiss.77 
Lawmakers could reduce this information asymmetry by allowing limited 
 
 73.  See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (2012) 
(adopting heightened pleading standards and a stay of discovery, among other procedural 
reforms, in securities class actions); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013) 
(proposing heightened pleading standards and fee shifting in patent litigation).  
 74.  For example, several states have developed form interrogatories for medical 
malpractice and product liability suits. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 84, Form 4 (uniform medical 
malpractice interrogatories); FLA. R. CIV. P. app. I, Forms 3, 4 (medical malpractice standard 
interrogatories to plaintiff and defendant); MD. R. app. Form 9-10 (uniform product liability 
definitions and interrogatories); N.J. CT. R. app. II, Form A(2), C(4) (uniform interrogatories 
for certain classes of products liability cases). 
 75.  See Hoffman, supra note 13, at 222 (discussing the “the cramped limits of pre-suit 
investigatory discovery” in most jurisdictions).  
 76.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only allow pre-suit discovery to perpetuate 
testimony. See FED. R. CIV. P. 27. Although some states allow a more expensive form of pre-suit 
discovery, many state rules mirror the federal rules. See Dodson, supra note 13, at 57; Hoffman, 
supra note 13, at 235 (“Most states have adopted the federal version of Rule 27 and have given 
their state rule a similarly cramped interpretation.”). 
 77.  See Dodson, supra note 13, at 54 (stating that, although Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure allows depositions to perpetuate testimony, “[c]ourts are nearly uniform in 
holding that it does not authorize discovery for the purpose of obtaining new facts needed to 
survive a motion to dismiss”). 
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pre-suit discovery. For example, as discussed in Part II, a plaintiff 
contemplating a medical malpractice case might not know whether her injury 
was caused by malpractice or bad luck.78 To prove malpractice, she will need 
broad discovery into a host of issues, from details about her procedure to the 
doctor’s experience and outcomes in other similar procedures. Before filing, 
however, she only needs enough information to confirm that malpractice may 
well have caused her injuries.79 With this more limited target, she does not 
need access to the full panoply of discovery tools. Instead, she can get a better 
sense of the merits of her claim by getting access to the doctor’s records and 
notes about her specific procedure and interviewing the doctor. 
These limits should be relatively easy to establish because the rules would 
be subject-specific. Lawmakers can determine what information plaintiffs in 
specific types of cases need prior to filing their lawsuit. To aid in this process, 
lawmakers can refer to standard interrogatories that many jurisdictions have 
already developed for specific types of cases. For example, many states have 
standard interrogatories for employment discrimination claims that 
lawmakers could use as a starting point.80 They could then discuss whether to 
augment these standard interrogatories with a limited number of depositions 
or other forms of discovery. This discovery would be less than the plaintiff 
would be entitled to during the normal discovery process, but it would 
nonetheless help to address the information asymmetry that these plaintiffs 
face. 
This proposal is unlikely to open the floodgates of discovery. Pre-suit 
discovery is already available in a small number of jurisdictions,81 and the 
empirical evidence indicates that courts have been able to cabin it 
appropriately. In Texas, for example, Rule 202 of the Rules of Civil Procedure 
 
 78.  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 79.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring that “factual contentions have evidentiary 
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery”).  
 80.  See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., DISC-002 FORM INTERROGATORIES-EMPLOYMENT LAW 
(2009), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/disc002.pdf. At the federal level, the Federal Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee joined together with the National Employment Lawyers Association and the 
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System to develop protocols and pattern forms 
for initial disclosures in employment cases. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PILOT PROJECT REGARDING INITIAL 
DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR EMPLOYMENT CASES ALLEGING ADVERSE ACTION 4–9 (2011), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/DiscEmpl.pdf/$file/DiscEmpl.pdf.  
 81.  Texas and Alabama both allow parties to obtain pre-suit discovery to investigate the 
merits of their claims. See ALA. R. CIV. P. 27; TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1, 202.4; Driskill v. Culliver, 797 
So.2d 495, 497–98 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (allowing pre-suit discovery “to determine whether the 
plaintiff has a reasonable basis for filing an action”). Other states, including New York and Ohio, 
allow the plaintiff to petition the court to obtain pre-suit discovery. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3102(c) 
(McKinney 2016) (“Before an action is commenced, disclosure to aid in bringing an action, to 
preserve information or to aid in arbitration, may be obtained, but only by court order.”); OHIO 
CIV. R. 34(D)(1) (“[A] person who claims to have a potential cause of action may file a petition 
to obtain discovery as provided in this rule.”). 
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allows a party to petition the court to take a deposition “to investigate a 
potential claim or suit.”82 Before granting the petition, the court must 
determine that the benefit of the requested deposition outweighs its potential 
cost.83 The court can include in its order any protections or limitations that it 
deems necessary to protect the deponent or others.84 
Empirical review of the Texas rule illustrates that it has not led to an 
onslaught of abusive litigation. A survey of more than 600 lawyers in Texas 
reveals that only half had either filed or received a Rule 202 petition at some 
point in the past.85 In approximately 60% of these instances, the purpose of 
the Rule 202 petition was to investigate the claim prior to filing, while the 
remaining 40% were filed to perpetuate testimony.86 Moreover, Texas courts 
have made clear that pre-suit depositions should not be the norm, with the 
Texas Supreme Court stating that “[t]he intrusion into otherwise private 
matters authorized by Rule 202 outside a lawsuit is not to be taken lightly” 
and “judges should maintain an active oversight role to ensure that [the rule 
is] not misused.”87 
Corporate law also offers opportunities for pre-suit discovery. Section 220 
of the Delaware General Corporation Law allows shareholders to inspect the 
books and records of a corporation as long as the inspection is made for a 
“proper purpose.”88 Courts have held that investigating wrongdoing by the 
corporation’s managers is a “proper purpose” within the scope of the 
statute.89 The Delaware Supreme Court has encouraged plaintiffs to use 
section 220 as an “information-gathering tool” to obtain the facts they need 
to plead a breach of fiduciary duty claim.90 There is no empirical evidence 
regarding the use of section 220, but courts have emphasized the “rifled 
precision” of this pre-suit discovery tool compared to the broad discovery 
available during the normal course of litigation.91 
These examples highlight the promise of pre-suit discovery in areas of 
 
 82.  See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1.  
 83.  See id. R. 202.4. Alternatively, the court can allow the deposition if it determines that 
allowing the deposition “may prevent a failure or delay of justice in an anticipated suit.” Id. 
 84.  See id. 
 85.  See Hoffman, supra note 13, at 222. 
 86.  See id. at 254.  
 87.  In re Does 1 & 2, 337 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam).  
 88.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2011); see also Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 
A.2d 912, 917 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Before shareholders may inspect books and records, they 
must . . . demonstrate a proper purpose for seeking inspection.”). 
 89.  See Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 777 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“A 
stockholder’s desire to investigate wrongdoing or mismanagement is a ‘proper purpose.’” (citing 
Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 121 (Del. 2006))); Melzer, 934 A.2d at 917 
(“There is no shortage of proper purposes under Delaware law, but perhaps the most common 
‘proper purpose’ is the desire to investigate potential corporate mismanagement, wrongdoing, 
or waste.” (footnote omitted)). 
 90.  See, e.g., Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 935 n.10 (Del. 1993).  
 91.  See Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 570 (Del. 1997). 
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law where information asymmetries are common. In these areas, lawmakers 
could allow pre-suit discovery subject to specific limitations. They could, for 
example, require plaintiffs to acquire the court’s permission before obtaining 
pre-suit discovery and establish presumptive limits on the information that the 
plaintiff would be allowed to request. Either party should also be able to ask 
the court to modify these limits if they are not appropriate in a given case. 
With such limits, lawmakers could address information asymmetries without 
opening the floodgates to full discovery. 
ii.     Pre-Filing Agency Review 
Lawmakers can also address information asymmetries by giving 
administrative agencies the authority to review claims before they are filed in 
court.92 As detailed below, however, the devil is truly in the details when it 
comes to crafting meaningful agency review. This Subpart argues that 
agencies need three specific things to be effective in their pre-suit review of 
information asymmetric cases: (1) the ability to investigate claims during the 
administrative process; (2) proper procedural safeguards to ensure that the 
claim is investigated fairly; and (3) adequate funding to support the agency’s 
investigatory efforts. 
a. Ability to Investigate Claims 
Agency review can only address information asymmetries if the agency 
has the power to investigate the plaintiffs’ claims. The example of medical 
malpractice claims illustrates this point. Many states require patients to file 
malpractice claims with a medical review board before going to court.93 In 
many instances, however, these review boards confine their review to the 
evidence that the patients already have, determining whether they can 
proceed to court without giving them any opportunity to get additional 
information about their claims. In these jurisdictions, pre-suit review does 
nothing to alleviate the information asymmetries. 
In a handful of jurisdictions, however, these review boards have the 
power to investigate claims and address any underlying information 
asymmetries.94 For example, patients in the Virgin Islands who wish to file a 
 
 92.  See, e.g., David F. Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 619 
(2013) (“In recent years, a growing chorus of commentators has offered an intriguing answer: 
vest administrative agencies with the power to oversee and manage private litigation efforts.”). 
 93.  See Jean M. Eggen, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: An Update and Assessment, J. 
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., June 2013, at 8 n.21 (collecting statutes adopting medical screening 
boards); see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6803–6814 (2015); 
FLA. STAT. § 766.106 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 671-11 to 671-19 (1993 & Supp. 2013); IDAHO 
CODE §§ 6-1001 to 6-1011 (2010 & Supp. 2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-8-4 (West 2011); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 65-4901 to 65-4908 (2002 & Supp. 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 1231.8 (2016); ME. 
STAT. tit. 24, §§ 2851–2859 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (2014). 
 94.  See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 24, § 2852(5) (“The panel, through the chairman, shall have the 
same subpoena power as exists for a Superior Court Judge. The chairman shall have sole 
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medical malpractice claim must first file their claim with the Medical 
Malpractice Review Committee.95 This Committee, which includes legal and 
medical representatives, then determines what type of medical expert or 
experts should review the claim.96 The Committee, at the territory’s 
expense,97 arranges for such experts to review the claim and then submit a 
written opinion regarding whether the defendants acted in accordance with 
“the appropriate standard of medical care.”98 The Committee also has the 
power “to request all necessary information from health care providers,” and 
the providers are required by statute to provide the Committee with the 
requested information.99 As a result, this process gives the plaintiffs a better 
understanding of precisely what happened to them and whether it constituted 
negligence, both of which are critical to enabling plaintiffs and their attorneys 
to weigh the merits of their claims prior to filing suit. 
While these procedures will provide plaintiffs with more information 
regarding the merits of a possible suit, agencies should not have unlimited 
power to investigate claims. If parties are allowed extensive discovery in the 
administrative proceedings, both sides will have to litigate their cases twice—
once before the administrative agency and once before the court. These dual 
proceedings will create additional costs that will impact both sides’ ability to 
litigate the claims efficiently. As a result, lawmakers should be careful to use 
agency review only in areas where the agencies will be able to make informed 
decisions based on review of a discrete set of information, as opposed to the 
full record that may be relevant if and when the case gets to court.100 
 
authority, without requiring the agreement of other panel members, to issue subpoenas.”); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60B (“The tribunal may upon the application of either party or upon its 
own decision summon or subpoena any such records or individuals to substantiate or clarify any 
evidence which has been presented before it and may appoint an impartial and qualified 
physician or surgeon or other related professional person or expert to conduct any necessary 
professional or expert examination of the claimant or relevant evidentiary matter and to report 
or to testify as a witness thereto.”). 
 95.  V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 166i(b) (2016) (“No action against a health care provider may 
be commenced in court before the claimant’s proposed complaint has been filed with the 
Committee . . . .”). 
 96.  Id. § 166i(d) (“The Committee shall determine, after expiration of the date for receipt 
of the defendant’s proposed answer, the type of medical expert or experts who are needed to 
review the malpractice claim.”). 
 97.  Id. § 166i(d)(3) (“The cost of obtaining expert opinion as required by this section shall 
be funded by the Medical Expert Fund created by 33 Virgin Islands Code, section 3042.”). 
 98.  See id. § 166i(d)(1) (“The Committee shall arrange for the expert to review the medical 
records and the legal papers submitted to the Committee and to submit to the Committee an 
opinion in writing concerning whether or not the defendant acted or failed to act within the 
appropriate standards of medical care as charged in the proposed complaint.”). 
 99.  See id. § 166i(d)(2) (“In order to fulfill its duties under this section, the Committee shall have 
the right and duty to request all necessary information from health care providers including hospitals, 
and said providers shall have the duty to supply such information to the Committee.”). 
 100.  See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 92, at 668 (“[T]here is little reason to believe that 
agencies wielding gatekeeper powers or courts will systematically vary in their capacity to judge a 
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b. Proper Procedural Safeguards 
Even with investigatory powers, agency review accomplishes little if the 
claimants are not protected by minimal due process protections. The Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) serves as a cautionary tale of the potential 
downside of administrative review. Under the PLRA, prisoners who seek to 
challenge the conditions of their confinement must first exhaust 
administrative remedies within the prison.101 On its face, this requirement 
seems reasonable. Prisons should have the opportunity to address prisoner 
grievances in-house before these grievances end up in court. 
The problem is that the PLRA does not include any procedural 
requirements for these grievance systems.102 As long as these systems are 
“available” to prisoners, they must be exhausted before a prisoner can file a 
lawsuit.103 As scholars have documented, prison grievance systems vary 
widely.104 The prisoner may or may not get a hearing. The designated 
factfinder may or may not be independent. And the rules may or may not 
provide the type of relief that the prisoner is seeking. Moreover, this 
exhaustion requirement operates like a procedural default rule, which means 
that a district court must dismiss any prisoner claims that have not been 
through the full gauntlet of administrative options.105 These detailed and 
often technical procedural requirements fall on the members of our society 
least able to comply with them—prisoners who are typically unrepresented by 
counsel and who may be mentally ill, underage, illiterate, and/or unable to 
 
claim’s factual sufficiency based on collected evidence or the weight to be accorded specific 
evidentiary showings, except perhaps in the most technical of areas.”). 
 101.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison 
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”). 
 102.  See Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: 
What It Means and What Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials Can Learn from It, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 483, 498 (2001) (“The only substantive requirement remaining on the face of the statute 
that administrative remedies must meet in order for the exhaustion requirement to apply is that 
the remedies be ‘available.’”). 
 103.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In contrast, the predecessor statute to the PLRA, the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act, required prisoners to exhaust administrative procedures that were “plain, 
speedy, and effective” and met specified federal guidelines. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1994); see also Porter v. 
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002). It also did not apply if the prisoner was only seeking money damages 
and such relief was not available through the prison’s grievance policy. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524. 
 104.  See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1650 (2003) (“[T]he 
PLRA imposes no constraints on the structure or rules of any grievance processing regime.”); 
Giovanna Shay & Johanna Kalb, More Stories of Jurisdiction-Stripping and Executive Power: Interpreting 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 291, 315–18 (2007) (discussing the 
differences among prison grievance systems nationwide). 
 105.  See, e.g., Minix v. Pazera, No. 1:04 CV 447 RM, 2005 WL 1799538 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 
2005) (dismissing a claim that a teen inmate had suffered serious abuse by other inmates because 
the teen had failed to report the abuse within two business days, as required by the juvenile 
detention facility’s grievance procedure).  
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speak English.106 
The PLRA illustrates the potential danger of administrative review. If 
lawmakers want to use agency review to address information asymmetries, they 
must ensure that this review offers procedural safeguards—including an 
independent decision-maker and clear instructions for filing a claim—to 
protect the rights of litigants. These safeguards should ensure that potential 
plaintiffs have a meaningful opportunity to present their claims. 
c. Adequate Funding 
Inadequate funding can also stymie administrative review, as the example 
of employment discrimination litigation demonstrates. Under Title VII, an 
employee who wants to file a claim of employment discrimination must first 
file the claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) or related state agency.107 After the claim is filed, the EEOC or 
other relevant agency interviews the claimant and makes a preliminary 
assessment of the merits of the claims.108 For those claims that the agency 
deems most likely to be meritorious, it will then investigate the claim by 
interviewing relevant witnesses, requesting documents, and even conducting 
an on-site visit of the employer’s office.109 The agency then determines 
whether there is probable cause to believe that discrimination occurred.110 
Again, in theory, this procedure appears sound. Employees have an 
opportunity to present their grievances to an agency that specializes in 
evaluating these types of claims. The agency then has the power to investigate 
the claims, addressing the information asymmetry that plagues plaintiffs. Yet 
the EEOC review process has sparked more than its fair share of criticism.111 
Over the decades since the EEOC was established, the EEOC has struggled 
with a formidable backlog of claims. At the end of 2014, for example, the 
 
 106.  See Shay & Kalb, supra note 104, at 319–20. 
 107.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (2012). 
 108.  See Michael C. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years: 
Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 327–30 (2001) 
(discussing the EEOC’s claim review process).  
 109.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b) (“Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person 
claiming . . . an unlawful employment practice, the Commission . . . shall make an investigation 
thereof.”). 
 110.  If the EEOC does not find reasonable cause, it will dismiss the administrative claim and the 
employee can file the claim in court. If the EEOC finds reasonable cause, it can invite the parties to 
participate in mediation or prosecute the claim itself. See Engstrom, supra note 92, at 696 (discussing 
the EEOC review process); Sternlight, supra note 11, at 1410–21 (discussing the same process). 
 111.  See, e.g., Gilbert F. Casellas, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Challenges for 
the Twenty-First Century, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 12 (1998) (former EEOC Chairman describing 
the agency’s “fundamental problem” as “too few resources for an increasing number of 
complaints”); Pauline T. Kim, Addressing Systemic Discrimination: Public Enforcement and the Role of 
the EEOC, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1133, 1143 (2015) (“A significant constraint on the EEOC’s ability to 
pursue systemic litigation is its limited resources given its statutory responsibilities.”). 
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EEOC had 73,134 claims waiting to be reviewed.112 
These issues reflect a deeper point about agency review. In some areas of 
the law, the volume of claims can be so overwhelming that agencies will 
struggle to investigate them properly or in a timely manner. In these 
situations, the legislature must decide whether to devote the funds necessary 
to process these claims. If the legislature is unwilling to do so, agency review 
may not be the best procedural option. Instead, it may be better to give 
plaintiffs other tools, such as pre-suit discovery, to allow them to evaluate their 
own claims. 
2. Ineffective Procedural Tools 
Lawmakers frequently turn to their standard menu of procedural tools 
to address cases involving information asymmetries. Yet many of these tools 
do not address the underlying reason that plaintiffs file information 
asymmetric cases. This Subpart discusses why two common procedural 
reforms—heightened pleading standards and fee-shifting—are not 
appropriate for information asymmetric cases. 
i.     Heightened Pleading 
It may seem obvious that legislatures should not adopt heightened 
pleading requirements in areas involving information asymmetries. The cases 
that survive under a heightened pleading regime are those in which plaintiffs 
have access to the information they need to support their claims before they 
file. The remaining cases—some of which may be meritorious and some of 
which may not be—will never make it past the pleading stage. As a result, in 
areas of the law where information asymmetries are common, heightened 
pleading will indiscriminately screen out a significant number of both 
meritorious and nonmeritorious claims. 
This fact, however, has not dampened the appeal of heightened pleading 
among lawmakers, even in areas of the law involving information asymmetries. 
In securities class actions, for example, plaintiffs must plead facts establishing 
a “strong inference” of scienter to survive a motion to dismiss.113 Information 
about scienter, or the defendant’s intent to defraud, is particularly difficult 
for plaintiffs to access prior to discovery because it concerns the defendant’s 
 
 112.  See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 APPENDIX, BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT 1251–53 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/ 
fy2016/assets/appendix.pdf. The EEOC review process has also come under fire because it 
reviews individual cases one at a time, rather than addressing more systemic evidence of 
discrimination in the workplace. See Engstrom, supra note 92, at 692–93. Administrative review 
may be less equipped to address these structural issues. See id. at 693 (“[R]egulatory efforts that 
successfully implement the structural approach will tend to be large-scale and systemic in nature 
and will also rely upon aggregate forms of proof as a way to reveal discriminatory decision-making 
structures.”). 
 113.  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2) (2012). 
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internal thoughts.114 
Similarly, in many states, a plaintiff cannot file a medical malpractice 
claim without first including in the complaint a certification from a medical 
expert that the plaintiff’s claim has merit.115 For cases in which the details of 
malpractice are clearly laid out in the plaintiff’s medical records, the plaintiff 
may easily be able to find a medical expert willing to make the required 
certification.116 For cases in which the details of malpractice were not 
documented in the records, however, certification requirements can pose an 
insurmountable problem.117 No plaintiff will be able to find an expert willing 
to certify that a case has merit when neither the expert nor the plaintiff has 
access to the information necessary to make this determination. 
Not surprisingly, empirical studies have demonstrated that heightened 
pleading requirements have especially harsh effects in cases in which plaintiffs 
do not have access to essential facts prior to discovery. At least some studies 
have revealed, for example, that heightened pleading standards have a 
significant impact in civil rights cases, including employment discrimination 
cases, which often involve information asymmetries.118 Some of these cases 
may well have been meritless; others might have been proven to be 
meritorious had the plaintiffs only had access to the facts necessary to support 
their claims. In areas involving an information asymmetry, heightened 
pleading indiscriminately restricts both types of cases. 
 
 114.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1410 n.35 (2002) (arguing that plaintiffs in securities class actions face a “Catch 
22,” especially against outsider defendants, because a plaintiff “cannot plead fraud with 
particularity until it obtains discovery, and it cannot obtain discovery under the PSLRA until it 
pleads fraud with particularity”). 
 115.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.203(2) (2015) (requiring a plaintiff to provide to the 
defendant a verified medical expert opinion corroborating that the plaintiff has reasonable 
grounds to support his or her claim); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (2015) (requiring the plaintiff 
to file with the complaint an affidavit by a medical expert setting forth “at least one negligent act 
or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim”); N.C. R. CIV. P. 9(j) 
(requiring a plaintiff to allege in the complaint that the plaintiff’s medical records have been 
reviewed by a medical expert who is willing to testify that the plaintiff’s treatment “did not comply 
with the applicable standard of care”).  
 116.  Or they may not be. See, e.g., STRUVE, supra note 10, at 60 (discussing other problems with 
certificate of merit requirements, including the additional costs of obtaining such a certificate).  
 117.  See id. at 59 (arguing that the “availability of information” creates a “risk of unfairness” 
to plaintiffs required to obtain certificate of merit in medical malpractice cases); Markle, supra 
note 10, at 420 (“Affidavit of merit requirements often require the plaintiff to find an expert 
willing to attest to the merits of their case without fully knowing the facts, and many experts are 
uncomfortable doing so.”). 
 118.  See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010). The empirical record is mixed, however, with 
other studies showing that Twombly and Iqbal have had a more limited impact. Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, 
Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 
2270 2330–32 (2012). See generally JOE S. CECIL ET AL., MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 
CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/17889/download. This mixed record likely 
reflects the fact that Twombly and Iqbal changed filing patterns in significant ways.  
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ii.     Fee Shifting 
Fee shifting is an even worse fit for cases involving an information 
asymmetry. In a handful of areas, legislatures have adopted or are currently 
considering laws allowing the prevailing party to recover its attorneys’ fees 
from the losing party.119 These laws stand in stark contrast to the so-called 
American rule, which requires each party to pay its own costs.120 
These laws go one step farther than heightened pleading rules. Rather 
than merely dismissing cases that lack factual support at the outset, these laws 
affirmatively punish plaintiffs who file these cases. Yet, as set out above, cases 
involving information asymmetries are essentially a gamble.121 Some of these 
cases will turn out to have factual support after discovery, while others will not. 
Given the lack of available information, however, plaintiffs must either make 
this gamble or abandon their claim entirely. Plaintiffs in these cases are not 
acting in bad faith or trying to game the system. Instead they are acting within 
the constraints of a system that does not allow them access to necessary 
information until after they file their claim. It does not make sense to punish 
these plaintiffs by forcing them pay their opponents’ legal fees. 
B. REDUCING COST ASYMMETRIES 
As explained above, the most common procedural tools—including 
heightened pleading and fee shifting—are not a good match for information 
asymmetric cases. These tools, however, are much better fit for cost 
asymmetric cases. This Subpart explores how lawmakers can use heightened 
procedures to reduce cost asymmetries and then turns to heightened 
procedures that are not a good match for these cases. 
1. Effective Procedural Tools 
This Subpart explores six procedural tools that lawmakers should 
consider in cost asymmetric cases—heightened pleading, fee shifting, cost 
shifting, stays of discovery, agency review, and prohibitions on settlement. 
i.     Heightened Pleading 
One possible reform that may be appropriate in cost asymmetric cases is 
heightened pleading. Heightened pleading came under fire in the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, but most of this 
criticism relates to its impact in information asymmetric cases.122 As these 
 
 119.  See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013) (proposing fee shifting in 
patent litigation).  
 120.  See Liang & Berliner, supra note 12, at 84 (“The default rule in litigation in U.S. federal courts 
is the American Rule under which both sides, win or lose, must bear their own attorneys’ fees.”). 
 121.  See supra Part II.A. 
 122.  See Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 29 
(2012) (“Where the informational asymmetry favors the responding party . . . there is little 
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critics note, Twombly sweeps too broadly, requiring many plaintiffs to plead 
facts that they cannot obtain prior to discovery.123 As a result, and as discussed 
above, heightened pleading requirements are particularly ill-suited for cases 
involving asymmetries in information.124 
These requirements are a better fit, however, in cases involving 
asymmetries in cost. In these cases, it makes sense to require plaintiffs to put 
their cards on the table early in the litigation, as long as such facts are available 
to them. If the plaintiffs are able to state a viable claim, they should be allowed 
to proceed to discovery. If, however, they do not have the facts to support their 
claims, even though such facts should be available to them, they should not 
be allowed to proceed to discovery and make the accompanying settlement 
demands. 
As with any procedural reform, heightened pleading requires careful 
consideration of a number of factors. First, lawmakers should only consider 
adopting heightened pleading requirements if plaintiffs with meritorious 
claims will have access to the information necessary to plead their claim. 
Otherwise, these pleading requirements risk eliminating meritorious and 
meritless claims alike. Procedural reforms should aim to sort the good cases 
from the bad ones, not simply limit litigation across the board. 
One way to avoid exacerbating information asymmetries is to include an 
explicit exception in the legislation for information that the plaintiff cannot 
reasonably obtain. Several bills pending in Congress to reform patent 
litigation include such an exception. The Innovation Act proposed in the 
House, for example, require plaintiffs to plead certain specified facts about 
their claim “unless the information is not reasonably accessible.”125 The 
PATENT Act—the Senate’s counterpart to the Innovation Act—includes the 
same language.126 These provisions allow pleading to serve a more stringent 
gatekeeping role in cost asymmetric cases without simultaneously 
exacerbating information asymmetries. 
 
justification for applying an information-forcing principle to the pleader.”); Stancil, supra note 
33, at 114 (“If the operative pleading standard required plaintiff to allege facts that she cannot 
reasonably be expected to know at the case’s inception, this informational asymmetry would in 
turn prevent proper functioning of the litigation market.”). 
 123.  See Miller, supra note 3, at 345 (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal were “two substantively 
highly unique cases” and therefore “[i]t makes no sense to apply the new pleading standard to 
the wide swath of relatively simple lawsuits that do not require extensive fact pleading or 
gatekeeping—with their attendant cost, delay, and risk of premature termination”). 
 124.  See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text. 
 125.  Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015) (“If information required to be 
disclosed under [the Act’s heightened pleading requirements] is not readily accessible to a party 
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, as required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, that information may instead be generally described, along with an 
explanation of why such undisclosed information was not readily accessible, and of any efforts 
made by such party to access such information.”).  
 126.  Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act of 2015, S. 1137, 
114th Congress § 3. 
A2_ERICKSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2016  8:26 PM 
2016] HEIGHTENED PROCEDURE 89 
Second, heightened pleading need not be an all-or-nothing proposal. 
Lawmakers can require heightened pleading for some elements, but not 
others.127 In 2013, for example, Florida enacted heightened pleading 
requirements in foreclosure cases.128 These new requirements followed a 
series of cases in which banks initiated foreclosure proceedings even though 
they did not own the mortgage to the property.129 In other words, banks were 
trying to foreclose on mortgages they did not own. In response, the Florida 
legislature took targeted action, requiring heightened pleading on the legal 
elements creating the problem. Specifically, the new law requires banks and 
other mortgage holders to “allege with specificity the factual basis by which 
the claimant is a person entitled to enforce the note” under Florida law.130 
The plaintiff must also either attach a copy of the original promissory note or 
allege an affidavit “detail[ing] a clear chain of all endorsements, transfers, or 
assignments of the promissory note.”131 With respect to all other elements of 
a foreclosure claim, normal pleading rules apply. These requirements 
therefore targeted the specific abuses that the legislature identified without 
raising pleading standards across the board. 
Third, lawmakers should be clear about exactly what the plaintiff is 
required to plead. One of the primary complaints about Twombly and Iqbal is 
that it is difficult to determine exactly what plaintiffs must allege to survive a 
motion to dismiss.132 This confusion is a result of the vague language that the 
Supreme Court used to explain its new pleading requirements. In Iqbal, for 
example, the Court held that a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face” and that “a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”133 This language 
sounds good in theory, but it is difficult for a plaintiff in a breach of contract 
case, for example, to know exactly what facts are required in the complaint to 
make it “plausible on its face.” As a result, the Supreme Court’s effort to 
 
 127.  Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure takes this approach, requiring plaintiff 
to plead fraud with particularity, but allowing the element of scienter to be alleged generally. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 9. 
 128.  FLA. STAT. § 702.015 (2015).  
 129.  See, e.g., Lindsey v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1D12–2406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 
2013) (dismissing a foreclosure claim because the bank did not own the mortgage in question); 
Harriet Johnson Brackey, Lauderdale Man’s Home Sold out from Under Him in Foreclosure Mistake, SUN 
SENTINEL (Sept. 23, 2010), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-09-23/business/fl-wrongful-
foreclosure-0922-20100921_1_foreclosure-defense-attorney-foreclosure-case-jumana-bauwens.  
 130.  FLA. STAT. § 702.015(2)(b) (2015). 
 131.  See id. § 702.015(4)–(5). 
 132.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 
JUDICATURE 109, 110 (2009) (stating that Iqbal “exacerbated confusion about pleading 
standards”); Spencer, supra note 15, at 1733 (arguing that, under Twombly and Iqbal, “inconsistent 
and inappropriate applications of the [heightened pleading standard] are inevitable” (footnote 
omitted)).  
 133.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
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streamline cases has spawned satellite litigation as litigants try to determine 
how the new requirements work in practice.134 
The Supreme Court in Twombly may not have been able to avoid this 
problem because it was trying to establish a rule that applies across the board. 
When lawmakers raise pleading standards in particular types of cases, 
however, they are better able to specify exactly what plaintiffs need to plead 
to survive a motion to dismiss. The Florida statute described above is one 
example of this specificity.135 Similarly, the Innovation Act requires the 
plaintiff to identify, among other things, “each patent allegedly infringed,” 
each accused “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . 
alleged to infringe any claim,” and “the principal business, if any, of the party 
alleging infringement”—detailed requirements that leave less room for 
ambiguity.136 
Legislatures have not always taken this detailed approach when it comes 
to heightened pleading. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”), for example, used vague language in raising the pleading 
standard for scienter, or the defendants’ intent to defraud.137 The relevant 
provision of the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead “with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state 
of mind.”138 This requirement sparked confusion in the lower courts as they 
tried to determine exactly what a “strong inference” of scienter requires.139 
The Supreme Court ultimately weighed in more than ten years after the 
PSLRA was enacted,140 but even then its opinion did not resolve all of the 
ambiguity.141 
Legislatures should keep these examples in mind when trying to enact 
 
 134.  See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821, 846 (2010) (“[W]e can expect a long period, perhaps a decade or more, of 
sorting and jostling before we have even a slightly clearer idea about what allegations must appear 
in complaints.”). 
 135.  See supra notes 130–31. 
 136.  Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015). 
 137.  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2)(A) (2012). In contrast, another provision of the PSLRA did 
include detailed pleading requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1) (2012). This provision 
instructs plaintiffs to “specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or 
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission 
is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which 
that belief is formed.” Id. This provision, like the mortgage and patent statutes above, clearly tells 
plaintiffs what they need to prove and has sparked little satellite litigation. 
 138.  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2)(A) (2012) 
(emphasis added).  
 139.  Aron Hansen, Comment, The Aftermath of Silicon Graphics: Pleading Scienter in Securities 
Fraud Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 769, 784 (2001) (describing “a three-way split of authority” 
among the circuit courts regarding the meaning of the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard). 
 140.  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 321–22 (2007) 
(interpreting the PSLRA’s “strong inference” language). 
 141. See generally Marvin Lowenthal, Note, Revitalizing Motive and Opportunity Pleading After 
Tellabs, 109 MICH. L. REV. 625 (2011) (discussing pleading strategies after Tellabs).  
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meaningful procedural reforms. Heightened pleading is designed to 
streamline the litigation process. It will not achieve this objective if the 
requirements themselves cause a new wave of satellite litigation. Pleading 
requirements that detail specifically what the plaintiff must allege are better 
able to avoid interpretative fights than the vaguer standards of Twombly and 
the PSLRA. 
ii.     Fee Shifting 
Fee shifting is another procedural option that has received its fair share 
of criticism.142 In cost asymmetric cases, however, fee-shifting rules can be a 
valuable tool to rebalance the costs of litigation. This Subpart explores the 
benefits of fee shifting in this class of cases and then examines how to address 
possible concerns. 
a. General Benefits of Fee Shifting 
Under the American rule, the parties in a lawsuit each pay their own 
attorney’s fees.143 By statute, however, state or federal lawmakers can reverse 
this rule, allowing prevailing parties to recover their attorneys’ fees from their 
opponents.144 In the right circumstances, a fee-shifting statute could help 
address the types of cost asymmetries discussed above. The problem in cost 
asymmetric cases is that the plaintiff has far less at stake than the defendant. 
The plaintiff can simply file a lawsuit and then sit back while the defendant 
racks up considerable discovery costs. As a result, the plaintiff has little to lose 
by filing a meritless lawsuit. 
Fee-shifting rules change this calculus.145 Plaintiffs who know that they 
 
 142.  See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 
1069, 1106–07 (1993) (arguing against two-way fee-shifting rules). As one example, Delaware recently 
prohibited corporations from including provisions in their bylaws after institutional investors argued 
that “these bylaws effectively make corporate directors and officers unaccountable for serious 
wrongdoing.” See Letter from Institutional Investors to Norm Monhait, Chair, Delaware Corporation 
Law Council (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/legal_issues/Letter% 
20to%20Norm%20Monahit%20(Final%20Revised%20December%2018).pdf; see also DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2011). 
 143.  See Macon Dandridge Miller, Catalysts as Prevailing Parties Under the Equal Access to Justice 
Act, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2002).  
 144.  In a variety of federal statutes, Congress has altered the American rule. HENRY COHEN, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 94-970, AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY FEDERAL COURTS 
AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 64–114 (2008). In most of these statutes, however, the fee shifting only 
applies to prevailing plaintiffs, giving these plaintiffs extra incentives to file lawsuits in areas of 
particular public concern, including civil rights, environmental, or consumer cases. See id. (listing 
federal statutes that authorize awards of attorneys’ fees). 
 145.  Companies are quite attentive to this point when negotiating commercial contracts. An 
empirical study by Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller examining more than 2000 commercial 
contracts found that the contracting parties opted out of the American rule in more than 60% of the 
contracts. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney 
Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 353 (2013). This study 
suggests that sophisticated parties prefer fee-shifting rules, likely because they discourage meritless 
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will have to pay their opponents’ legal fees if they lose will be far more 
reluctant to file a meritless case.146 Along the same lines, defendants who 
know that they will be able to recover their legal fees if they prevail will no 
longer see these fees as sunk costs in the case.147 As a result, they will have a 
greater incentive both to defend against the claims and oppose nuisance 
settlements. Fee-shifting rules can therefore make plaintiffs less eager to file 
meritless claims and defendants less eager to settle them. 
b. Addressing Concerns about Fee Shifting 
Despite these benefits, however, fee shifting is not appropriate in all cost 
asymmetric cases. This Subpart will explore several common objections to fee-
shifting rules and discuss ways to shape fee shifting to address these 
objections. 
One oft-cited concern is the fact that fee shifting can reduce access to the 
courts.148 Litigants who face financial ruin if they are unsuccessful may be 
unwilling to file lawsuits, even if they think their claims would be meritorious. 
This concern may be less pressing in the areas of law addressed in this Article 
because these areas by definition involve primarily meritless claims. Yet within 
each of these areas are hidden meritorious claims that society should protect. 
Fee-shifting statutes risk sweeping too broadly, discouraging both meritless 
and meritorious claims alike. 
These concerns apply most acutely to claims filed by low and middle-
income litigants.149 The wealthiest plaintiffs will still be willing to file claims 
they believe to be meritorious because they know that, even if they turn out 
to be wrong, they will be able to pay their opponent’s legal fees without too 
much financial difficulty. Low and middle-income plaintiffs, however, risk 
financial ruin if they lose. As a result, they may be unwilling to file even 
 
claims and more fully compensate the prevailing party for their litigation costs.  
 146.  See Liang & Berliner, supra note 12, at 91 (“There is a general consensus that the British 
Rule, as used in Britain, encourages high-merit, low-damage cases, while discouraging low-merit, 
high-damage cases. . . . The American Rule, by comparison, encourages plaintiffs with 
questionable claims, but large claimed damages, to file suit.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 147.  See id.; Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: 
Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 349 (1990) (“Under the English rule, the nuisance 
suit strategy is less credible since a defendant who recognizes that a claim lacks merit has a valuable 
counterclaim given his costs are likely to be shifted if the case goes to trial.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 148.  See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Fee Shifting and The Free Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1818 
(2013) (“By increasing the stakes of litigation—so that a losing plaintiff is stuck not only with its 
own legal fees but also with its opponent’s—fee shifting may render litigation just too expensive 
and risky for plaintiffs to bear.”); William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1878 (2002) (“Fee- and cost-shifting may, of course, exacerbate, not 
ameliorate, the negative procedural consequences of unequal litigant wealth.”). 
 149.  See, e.g., NANCY MEADE, ATTORNEY’S FEE SHIFTING: PERCEPTIONS ON ITS IMPACT IN 
ALASKA 34–37 (2012) (discussing survey results that reflected particular concern about the 
impact of fee-shifting rules on middle-income litigants); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on 
Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1619–20 (1993). 
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meritorious cases if there is some chance that they will lose. 
The market may provide a solution to this concern. In England, fee 
shifting is the norm, allowing prevailing parties in a lawsuit to recover their 
attorneys’ fees from their opponents as a matter of course.150 A robust after-
the-event (“ATE”) insurance market has developed in response, allowing a 
party who is nervous about the consequences of losing at trial to purchase 
insurance to cover his opponent’s legal fees in event of a loss.151 The parties 
can typically collect their own premiums for this insurance if they win,152 
reflecting the prevailing wisdom that ATE insurance is simply another type of 
litigation cost. 
ATE insurance is premised on the insurance carrier’s ability to price the 
risk. The carrier assesses the claims’ likelihood of success, evaluating the legal 
and factual arguments as well as the likely costs of litigation. Such screening 
prevents a moral hazard problem in which only individuals with weaker cases 
seek insurance. Because insurance carriers can price their risk, they can 
charge riskier litigants a higher premium, which shifts the costs of meritless 
claims back to plaintiffs.153 
Aside from this market-based option, lawmakers can also respond to 
concerns about fee shifting in the rules themselves. First, lawmakers can 
attempt to narrowly define the category of cases in which fee shifting applies. 
Rather than imposing a fee-shifting rule in all patent cases, for example, they 
can identify those most likely to be meritless and impose fee shifting on only 
this subset of cases. This option obviously depends on the ability of lawmakers 
to distinguish between meritless and meritorious cases and then write this 
distinction into the fee-shifting statute, which itself depends on the specific 
circumstances in that area of the law. 
Second, lawmakers may be able to tailor the fee award to the party’s 
ability to pay. Rather than face financial ruin if they lose, a fee-shifting statute 
could require losing parties to pay an amount based on a sliding scale tied to 
their net worth. Under this approach, plaintiffs would still feel a financial bite 
if they file meritless claims, but it would not be severe enough to discourage 
them from filing all claims. 
Finally, lawmakers can give judges discretion to award fees in particular 
cases, trusting judges to identify the truly meritless cases. As discussed in 
greater detail below, however, judges are often reluctant to order losing 
 
 150.  See Molot, supra note 148, at 1816–17. 
 151.  See id. 
 152.  See Collin M. Davison, Fee Shifting and After-the-Event Insurance: A Twist to a Thirteenth-
Century Approach to Shifting Attorneys’ Fees to Solve a Twenty-First Century Problem, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 
1199, 1204 (2011).  
 153.  Litigation finance agreements could also provide a market-based solution to concerns 
over fee shifting, with investment financiers agreeing to pay litigation costs if their client loses but 
also receiving a share of the proceeds if the case is successful. See generally Maya Steinitz, Whose 
Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011).  
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parties to pay their opponents’ legal fees, especially if the loser is an 
individual, rather than a corporation.154 As a result, although judges may be 
able to tailor fee-shifting rules better than a fee-shifting statute that applies 
across the board, judges could use their discretion in ways that could 
undermine the larger statutory scheme. Legislators may be able to avoid this 
concern by limiting judicial discretion to specified types of situations. 
In short, there are both market and statutory options to ameliorate 
concerns that fee-shifting rules will reduce access to justice. In areas where 
these options do not provide enough reassurance, lawmakers may want to use 
a different procedural tool. With heightened pleading, for example, plaintiffs 
risk dismissal, but not financial ruin. If lawmakers are concerned about 
deterring cases that have significant social value, they may want to choose a 
lower-stakes procedural tool like heightened pleading rather than the high-
stakes tool of fee shifting. 
Fee-shifting rules are also inappropriate if plaintiffs do not have enough 
money to pay the defendants’ expenses. This point is illustrated by efforts to 
reform medical malpractice law in the 1980s. In 1980, the Florida Medical 
Association (“FMA”) successfully lobbied the state legislature to adopt a 
mandatory two-way fee-shifting rule in medical malpractice cases.155 Within 
five years, however, the FMA returned to the Florida legislature, asking it to 
repeal the statute. They reversed course in part because the unsuccessful 
plaintiffs in these cases were often insolvent and thus, under the statute, were 
excused from paying their opponents’ fees.156 A statute that nominally applied 
to plaintiffs and defendants alike had turned into a one-way fee-shifting 
statute against doctors and nurses—exactly the opposite result that lawmakers 
had intended. 
The Florida example illustrates that fee-shifting statutes have little teeth 
if plaintiffs do not have enough money to pay their opponents’ legal fees. 
Circling back to a proposal discussed above, one way to avoid this risk is to 
require low-income and even middle-income plaintiffs to pay a smaller 
percentage of their opponents’ legal fees. These amounts could be tied to the 
plaintiffs’ income or net worth. Such limits would still impose some cost on 
plaintiffs who file meritless lawsuits, but it would not impose liability that they 
have little or no ability to pay. 
Fee-shifting rules are also difficult to implement in class actions. This 
difficulty arises because plaintiff class members may not know that they are 
part of the class, especially if the class is an opt-out class action under Rule 
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.157 It is one thing to allow 
 
 154.  See infra notes 166–73 and accompanying text. 
 155.  See Snyder & Hughes, supra note 147, at 355. 
 156.  See Rennie, supra note 12, at 21–22. 
 157.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). In opt-out class actions, class members are automatically part of the 
class upon class certification, and they can only get out of the class and avoid being bound by the 
judgment by affirmatively opting out. See, e.g., 14 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
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opt-out class actions when the class members stand only to benefit from the 
litigation. It is another thing altogether to make individuals parties to a lawsuit 
without their knowledge when they could lose a considerable amount of 
money. Even aside from due process concerns, it would be a logistical 
nightmare to collect attorneys’ fees from thousands of class members. 
Nor can we avoid these concerns by placing the risk of loss on class 
representatives, rather than individual class members. At first glance, class 
representatives are a more attractive target than absent class members 
because they chose to participate in the suit and therefore would know that 
they stand this risk of loss. It would also be easier to collect from a few named 
representatives than from the entire class. In practice, though, this option 
would almost certainly discourage putative class members from participating 
in class actions because it would dramatically change the financial calculus of 
doing so. If a class action is successful, the class representatives only recover 
their pro rata share of the total judgment, which is often a fairly small amount 
of money.158 If the class action is not successful, however, the class 
representative would be liable for the entire fee award, which could amount 
to millions of dollars.159 Faced with this imbalance, few class representatives 
would agree to lend their name to a lawsuit. 
There are at least two ways to address these risks. First, as explained 
above, litigants may be able to purchase after-the-event insurance similar to 
the model seen in England and other European countries.160 Class counsel 
could buy this insurance on behalf of class representatives to protect them 
from personal liability if the class action were unsuccessful.161 In such cases, 
the insurance company would effectively serve as the gatekeeper of frivolous 
litigation by pricing policies based at least in part on the suit’s likelihood of 
success. 
A second way around this problem is to put the risk of loss on class 
counsel.162 Instead of making class representatives liable for the defendants’ 
 
PROCEDURE § 1787 (4th ed. 2015) (discussing opt-out rights in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions).  
 158.  See Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”: Alternative 
Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 153 (2001) (“Such fee liability, 
if routinely imposed on named class representatives, would likely bring that necessary species close to 
extinction, because the representatives could hope for only a small share of the recovery while facing 
liability for all defense fees (even assuming continuation of the contingent fee on the plaintiffs’ side, 
sparing the representatives from liability for fees of the class’s own counsel).”). 
 159.  See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Role in Class Action and 
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 20 (1991).  
 160.  See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign-Attorney Paradigms from 
Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 125, 144 (2003) (“If class counsel are unlikely to act as 
insurers against the down-side risk of fee liability for a losing class, protection against the risk 
might come from commercial insurers.”). 
 161.  See id.  
 162.  See Hensler & Rowe, supra note 158, at 153 (“As a threshold matter, it seems clear that 
the liability for shifted attorney fees in any loser-pays system would have to rest on attorneys for 
the class, rather than on the class representatives or the class as a whole.”). 
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costs, lawmakers could require class counsel to pay the defendant’s legal fees 
if the lawsuit is unsuccessful. These potential losses could be offset by higher 
fees awarded to class counsel in successful cases. One concern with this 
approach, however, is that it could create a conflict of interest between class 
counsel and members of the class.163 Situations could arise in which class 
counsel would be better off with a lower settlement rather than risk having to 
pay their opponents’ legal fees if the case continues, even if the class itself, 
facing no such risk of loss, would rather roll the dice on a judgment at trial.164 
Such a conflict already exists to a lesser extent in any class action, given that 
class counsel often advances the costs of the lawsuit and, through contingency 
fee arrangements, may stand to gain more than any individual class 
member.165 Nonetheless, putting such a large risk of loss on class counsel runs 
the risk of exacerbating this conflict. 
Judicial discretion may also act as a roadblock to implementing fee-
shifting schemes. Studies from the United States and abroad demonstrate that 
judges are often reluctant to enforce fee-shifting statutes, especially against 
individual plaintiffs. 
In Israel, for example, courts have limited discretion in deciding whether 
to order a losing party to pay its opponents’ legal fees.166 Judges are supposed 
to award all prevailing parties their fees unless doing do would unreasonably 
impair access to justice and equality or cause over-deterrence.167 Yet, at least 
one empirical study concluded that judges apply these rules in ways that 
protect individual plaintiffs.168 When an individual plaintiff wins a tort case 
against a corporate defendant, for example, the corporate defendant has to 
pay both its own fees and the fees of its opponent 99% of the time.169 Yet, 
when a corporate defendant wins against an individual plaintiff, they only 
recover their own costs 52% of the time.170 
This study is consistent with even more modest fee-shifting rules in the 
United States. Although the United States does not have rules requiring fee 
shifting across the board, it has enacted fee-shifting statutes in specific areas 
of the law.171 In patent cases for example, 35 U.S.C. § 285 allows the court to 
 
 163.  See, e.g., Marc I. Gross, Loser Pays—Or Whose “Fault” Is It Anyway: A Response to Hensler-
Rowe’s “Beyond ‘It Just Ain’t Worth It’”, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 168 (2001) (arguing that 
“allocating the risk of loss to plaintiffs’ counsel, rather than to the plaintiffs themselves, creates a 
conflict of interest between attorney and client”). 
 164.  See id. 
 165.  See Macey & Miller, supra note 159, at 41–44 (discussing conflicts of interest between 
class counsel and class representatives).  
 166.  Theodore Eisenberg et al., When Courts Determine Fees in a System with a Loser Pays Norm: 
Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1452, 1464–66 (2013). 
 167.  See id.  
 168.  See generally id.  
 169.  See id. at 1488. 
 170.  See id. 
 171.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) (authorizing fee shifting in patent litigation); OKLA. 
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award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in “exceptional cases.”172 
Empirical studies have found, however, that judges award attorneys’ fees 
under this statute in an extremely small percentage of cases and that plaintiffs 
are far more likely to recover their fees than defendants.173 
These studies suggest that courts both here and abroad may be reluctant 
to order the losing parties in litigation to pay their opponents’ legal fees, 
especially if the losing party is an individual plaintiff. This complicates the use 
of fee-shifting rules, especially because the losing parties in these cases should, 
by definition, be the plaintiffs. Put bluntly, if the goal of fee-shifting rules is to 
eliminate meritless cases, judges may be the biggest hurdle. 
Legislators can get around this issue by enacting mandatory fee-shifting 
rules except in clearly defined situations. The Equal Access to Justice Act 
serves as an example of such a statute, albeit in a very different context.174 This 
Act was designed to encourage plaintiffs to file civil rights claims against the 
government—rather than to discourage meritless litigation—but it provides 
an example of a mandatory fee-shifting statute with very few exceptions.175 
The Act provides that a court “shall” award fees to prevailing plaintiffs in a 
suit filed against the government.176 The statute includes few exceptions to 
this mandatory fee-shifting rule,177 and judges are therefore not able to 
implement the statute in ways that undercut its core mission. Fee-shifting 
statutes in cost asymmetric cases could similarly require judges to order the 
losing party to pay the winner’s attorneys’ fees, unless a narrowly drawn 
exception applies. 
 
 
STAT. tit 18 § 1126(C) (Supp. 2015) (authorizing fee shifting in shareholder derivative suits). 
 172.  35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012). The Supreme Court recently overturned Federal Circuit 
precedent sharply restricting the cases in which the district court was authorized to award fees to 
the prevailing party, instead holding that “an ‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from 
others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both 
the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was 
litigated.” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014).  
 173.  See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on 
Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 18 (2005) (finding that courts shifted fees to the 
alleged infringer in approximately “1% of patent suits that terminated via pre-trial motion or 
trial” over the last ten years); Liang & Berliner, supra note 12, at 87 (finding that “fees were 
awarded in about 6 percent of all patent cases ending in judgment [i.e., those that did not 
settle] . . . or 0.6 percent of all patent cases”).  
 174.  28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012).  
 175.  See, e.g., 14 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3660.1 (4th 
ed. 2015) (“In enacting the EAJA, Congress responded to concerns that the expense of litigation 
could deter individuals from defending against or seeking review of Government action that was 
regarded as unreasonable or illegal.”). 
 176.  28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).  
 177.  See id.  
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iii.     Cost Shifting 
Legislators could also rebalance cost asymmetries by requiring the parties 
in a lawsuit to share discovery costs. In the typical civil case, each party pays its 
own discovery costs.178 As explained above, this approach creates a cost 
asymmetry if one side’s discovery costs are far greater than their opponents’ 
costs.179 Litigants can exploit this asymmetry by filing a meritless lawsuit, 
serving extensive discovery requests on their opponents, and then offering to 
settle for less than the cost of discovery. 
To avoid this situation, legislatures could authorize limited cost shifting. 
Rather than requiring each side to pay its own costs, the legislature could 
require the party requesting discovery to pay for some or all of the other side’s 
costs in producing that discovery. Such a requirement would eliminate the 
ability to exploit cost asymmetries in discovery and give both sides an incentive 
to tailor their discovery requests to the specific needs of the litigation. 
This proposal has important differences from the fee-shifting rules 
described above. First, unlike fee-shifting rules, which only require losing 
parties to contribute to their opponents’ attorneys’ fees, cost-shifting rules 
would require each side to share the costs of litigation more evenly, regardless 
of which side ultimately prevails. Second, this proposal would only apply to 
discovery costs. Other litigation costs—including the costs of filing and 
responding to motions and the costs of preparing for trial—would remain on 
the party incurring the costs. Cost shifting is therefore a more targeted 
approach to address the specific cost asymmetries in discovery. 
Like the other heightened procedural tools outlined above, this option 
is not without risks. Cost-shifting rules, like their fee-shifting counterparts, 
could raise access-to-justice concerns. If a party cannot afford the high costs 
of discovery, it may not be able to pursue its claims, creating the possibility 
that some meritorious claims will not be filed. One way to avoid this possibility 
is to impose a sliding scale for cost sharing, with a party’s required 
contribution to depend on their financial resources. Alternatively, the 
legislature could give judges the discretion to waive cost-sharing rules in cases 
that raise access-to-justice concerns, although this discretion could raise the 
same concerns outlined above in connection with fee shifting. 
Additionally, cost-shifting rules could give defendants an incentive to 
drive up their discovery costs. If defendants know they can bill their 
opponents for half of the discovery costs, they may spend more. This is 
especially true if their opponent is an individual with limited means who may 
choose to settle or walk away from a meritorious suit rather than risk having 
to pay exorbitant costs. In this way, cost shifting could create the opposite 
 
 178.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that the prevailing party can recover its 
court costs from their opponent, but not attorneys’ fees or other expenses, including discovery 
costs. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1).  
 179.  See supra Part II.B. 
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problem from that which exists now. Rather than defendants agreeing to 
nuisance settlements to avoid high discovery costs, plaintiffs might accept less 
than their claim is worth to avoid paying their share of high discovery costs. 
Courts could try to avoid this problem by managing the discovery process 
more closely. Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already 
requires parties to meet early in the litigation to develop a joint discovery 
plan.180 In cases with required cost shifting, the parties could also be required 
to agree on the projected costs of each phase of discovery. If they disagree on 
these projected costs, either side could ask the court to intervene. If either 
party exceeds the costs set out in the plan, they would not be able to shift any 
of the additional costs to their opponent. This approach could resolve 
disputes over costs early before any such costs are incurred. It could also make 
it more difficult for the defendants to impose excessive costs on plaintiffs 
because the parties would have to agree on these costs early in the litigation. 
iv.     Stays on Discovery 
Lawmakers can also target cost asymmetric cases by staying discovery until 
the plaintiff survives a motion to dismiss. Congress used this procedural tool 
in the PSLRA.181 Under the PSLRA, courts can only allow discovery during the 
pendency of a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff can establish that 
“particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent 
undue prejudice.”182 Congress is considering whether to impose a similar stay 
on discovery in patent litigation.183 
This tool, however, is unlikely to be a panacea for lawmakers seeking to 
rein in meritless litigation. Even under the current rules, plaintiffs are not 
automatically entitled to discovery upon filing a lawsuit. Discovery in a federal 
civil case may not commence until “the parties have conferred as required by 
Rule 26(f).”184 This conference must occur at least 21 days before a Rule 16 
scheduling conference with the judge,185 which itself must occur “within the 
earlier of 90 days after any defendant has been served . . . or 60 days after any 
defendant has appeared.”186 Putting all of these rules together, it may be more 
than three months after the filing of the complaint before the plaintiff can 
serve the first discovery requests. During this time period, it is certainly 
possible for the parties to brief a motion to dismiss. 
 
 180.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).  
 181.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77z–1(b)(1) (2012). 
 182.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–(b)(3)(B) (2012); see also Winer Family Tr. v. Queen, No.  
03–4318, 2004 WL 350181 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2004) (lifting the stay of discovery to allow a 
deposition of a witness diagnosed with Stage IV brain cancer, but denying any other discovery 
during the pendency of the motion to dismiss).  
 183.  See Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 184.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 185.  See id. R. 26(f). 
 186.  See id. R. 16(b)(2). 
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That said, there is no automatic stay on discovery under the federal 
rules.187 If the parties hold their Rule 16 scheduling conference relatively 
quickly, the plaintiff may be able to serve early discovery requests and drive 
up the costs of litigation before the defendant has a chance to file a motion 
to dismiss.188 A plaintiff could also serve discovery while a motion to dismiss is 
pending, putting pressure on the defendant to settle.189 While a defendant 
could petition the court for a stay during this period, it would not be 
automatically entitled to one.190 
A stay of discovery such as that used in the PSLRA is most helpful in cases 
in which the plaintiff will not survive a motion to dismiss. In these cases, the 
plaintiff will not have access to discovery at all and will therefore be unable to 
exploit a cost asymmetry. As a result, lawmakers considering discovery stays 
should evaluate whether the specific area of law is one in which most plaintiffs 
are able to survive a motion to dismiss. 
v.     Agency Review 
Lawmakers can also consider using administrative agencies to screen 
cases that present a cost asymmetry. As discussed above, agency review is 
frequently used as a tool to screen legal claims,191 and scholars have 
recommended expanding the screening function of administrative agencies 
in additional areas of the law.192 
Administrative review offers some benefits in addressing cost asymmetries 
compared to the other procedural tools discussed above. First, administrative 
agencies are intended to be experts in their field. As a result, they may be 
better able to sort the good cases from the bad ones than a judge. Second, 
administrative review can be more flexible than other procedural tools. With 
heightened pleading, for example, all plaintiffs who file specific types of 
claims must allege the necessary facts before getting access to discovery. The 
judge does not have the discretion to give particular plaintiffs who cannot 
allege these facts access to discovery even if the judge thinks that a particular 
plaintiff may well have a meritorious claim. With administrative review, on the 
 
 187.  See id. R. 26(d)(1). 
 188.  See Dodson, supra note 13, at 54 (“If discovery is allowed pending the motion to dismiss, 
plaintiffs may obtain the information they need to survive Twombly and Iqbal in an amended 
complaint.”); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 507 
(2010) (“While the opinions in Twombly, as well as most commentators, seem to assume that surviving 
a 12(b)(6) motion is a prerequisite to discovery, this is simply not the case.” (citation omitted)). 
 189.  See Hartnett, supra note 188, at 507 (“The mere filing of a motion to dismiss does not 
trigger a stay of discovery.”). 
 190.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). 
 191.  See supra Part III.A.1.ii. 
 192.  See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1301 
(2008) (proposing that the Securities & Exchange Commission exercise greater oversight over 
securities class actions).  
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other hand, the agency can evaluate the cases on a more individualized basis, 
using its expertise and experience to determine which ones should be allowed 
to proceed to discovery and which ones should be dismissed at a more 
preliminary stage. 
Yet administrative review does present some risks in cost asymmetric 
cases. To review cases effectively, agencies need at least some information 
about the claims. They also need to establish procedures that give both sides 
an opportunity to be heard. As a result, this process could be expensive for 
both the agency and the parties involved. If the costs fall disproportionately 
on the defendant, as they might if the agency allows even limited discovery, 
they could exacerbate the already-existing cost asymmetries. This is especially 
true if the agency determination is simply advisory and thus plaintiffs who lose 
before the agency can still proceed with their claims in court. Furthermore, 
even if the costs fall equally on the parties, they could increase the cost of 
litigation across the board, raising concerns about efficiency and access to 
justice. 
Careful design of any administrative review scheme is therefore essential, 
with a few points meriting particular note here. First, any review scheme 
should be designed in a way that does not increase the cost asymmetries. For 
example, the parties may be required to share the costs associated with the 
review, including discovery costs. Second, agency review may be best suited 
for cases that are likely to survive a motion to dismiss. If the defendant can get 
the case dismissed prior to discovery, there is no need for lawmakers to create 
a complicated administrative regime. Instead, a stay of discovery may be 
sufficient to prevent parties in these cases from exploiting cost asymmetries. 
Finally, lawmakers should consider how much power administrative 
agencies should have to decide which cases can proceed to court. In some 
areas of the law, agencies make a preliminary judgment about the merits of 
claims, but they cannot bar plaintiffs from proceeding to court.193 The 
agency’s review is advisory and ultimately nonbinding. Perhaps, however, if 
the agency believes that the case does not have merit and was filed solely to 
exploit a cost asymmetry, the agency should be able to bar the plaintiff from 
filing the case. 
It is fair to ask whether we want agencies to decide who gets inside the 
courthouse doors. In some cases, however, this form of gatekeeping review 
may be better than the current reliance on pleading rules. Under current 
federal rules, the only way to screen a case before discovery is to file a motion 
 
 193.  For example, even if the EEOC does not think that a claim has merit, it still cannot bar 
the employee from filing the claim. See Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). 
Similarly, medical screening panels typically do not bar patients from proceeding to court, 
although the panels’ decisions may be admissible in court. See Eggen, supra note 93, at 13 (stating 
that “admissibility of panel findings gives a panel statute the teeth that it otherwise may lack as a 
nonbinding device”). 
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to dismiss, typically on the grounds that the complaint does not state a viable 
claim. If the complaint can include enough factual detail, it will typically 
survive a motion to dismiss even if the claims are unlikely to be proven at trial. 
An agency can look behind the pleadings to the merits of the case, conducting 
a review that may allow more accurate judgments. 
vi.     Prohibitions on Settlements 
A final, and more radical, procedural option in cost asymmetric cases is 
a complete ban on settlements, at least prior to summary judgment. This tool 
has never been used by lawmakers, but it has been proposed in various 
iterations by a number of scholars.194 Professors Randy Kozel and David 
Rosenberg, for example, argue that, in areas of law prone to nuisance 
settlements, defendants should be required to file summary judgment 
motions before they can enter into enforceable settlement agreements.195 
This proposal is based on the idea that a truly meritless case should be 
dismissed at the summary judgment stage because the plaintiff will be unable 
to establish a genuine issue of material fact.196 Yet many meritless cases do not 
get to this stage because defendants settle early in the litigation rather than 
incur the discovery costs that precede most summary judgment motions.197 By 
removing the option of settlement, these scholars hope to take away the 
incentive to file these cases in the first instance. 
Such a proposal, however, could be politically unpopular because it 
constrains the purported victims in these cases—the defendants. Lawmakers 
may be hesitant to tell defendants that they cannot settle on the ground that 
such a ban will discourage future meritless cases. Rather than constraining 
defendants’ options in this way, defendants could fairly ask legislatures to use 
other heightened procedural tools that apply to plaintiffs, such as heightened 
pleading requirements or fee shifting. 
An alternate proposal attempts to address these concerns by giving 
defendants the option to tie their own hands in cost asymmetric cases.198 
Under this proposal, in those areas of the law where nuisance suits are 
common, defendants would be able to exercise an option at the start of the 
case to have any subsequent settlement agreements rendered unenforceable, 
essentially ensuring that the option of settlement is taken off the table.199 After 
the defendant exercises this option, so the theory goes, the plaintiff will know 
 
 194.  See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: 
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1853 (2004); Megan M. La Belle, Against 
Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 375, 432–41 (2014). 
 195.  See Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 194, at 1860. 
 196.  See id. at 1851–52. 
 197.  See id. at 1851. 
 198.  See David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of Nuisance Suits: The 
Option to Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 42, 42 (2006).  
 199.  See id. at 43. 
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that it will not be able to get a nuisance settlement and will drop the case.200 
This proposal would only work if the defendant was fairly sure that the 
plaintiff was not willing to take the case to trial. 
One benefit of both mandatory summary judgment motions and options 
to bar settlement is that they operate with little involvement from the court. 
Unlike Rule 11 sanctions, judges do not need to conduct a lengthy inquiry 
into the plaintiff’s motive for filing suit or the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s 
position.201 And unlike heightened pleading or cost shifting, judges would not 
need to spend time applying or implementing these tools because the tools 
themselves would be largely self-executing. Once the defendant exercised the 
option to bar settlement, for example, that option would be off the table 
without requiring any review or decision-making from the court. 
2. Ineffective Procedural Tools 
This Subpart addresses two procedural tools that are inappropriate for 
cost asymmetric cases. The first of these tools—pre-suit discovery—obviously 
does not make sense in cases in which asymmetric discovery costs created the 
underlying problem. The second tool—mandatory Rule 11 sanctions—
intuitively has more appeal because sanctions raise the stakes for plaintiffs 
who engage in bad-faith litigation. As explained below, however, such 
sanctions are unlikely to be a panacea in cost asymmetric cases. 
i.     Pre-Suit Discovery 
Perhaps it goes without saying that pre-suit discovery—a promising 
procedural tool for cases involving an information asymmetry—is 
inappropriate in cases involving a cost asymmetry.202 As detailed in Subpart 
III.A, it is difficult for plaintiffs to obtain formal discovery prior to filing a 
complaint.203 Unlike with information asymmetrical cases, there is no reason 
for lawmakers to change standard rules barring pre-suit discovery in cases in 
which defendants settle meritless claims to avoid the high cost of litigation. 
This point has potential real-world implications. In the wake of Twombly 
and Iqbal, some scholars have suggested that lawmakers relax the rules 
prohibiting pre-suit discovery in civil cases generally in federal court.204 
Although this proposal could ameliorate the harsh effects of Twombly and Iqbal 
in many cases, it could also exacerbate the cost asymmetries in other cases. As 
a result, pre-suit discovery does not make sense as a transsubstantive rule, and 
lawmakers open to this procedural option should consider exempting cases 
 
 200.  See id.  
 201.  See id. at 49. 
 202.  As discussed in Part III.C.2, modified versions of these tools may be appropriate in cases 
involving both a cost and information asymmetry.  
 203.  See supra Part III.A.1.i. 
 204.  See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 23. 
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that are likely to involve a significant cost asymmetry. 
ii.     Mandatory Rule 11 Review 
Mandatory Rule 11 reviews are also not an effective way to address cost 
asymmetric cases, although this point is less obvious. Under Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, attorneys must sign all pleadings, motions, 
and other papers submitted to the court certifying that, to the best of their 
knowledge, the submissions have a good faith basis in law and fact.205 Courts 
typically conduct a Rule 11 inquiry only upon motion of a party, but they also 
have the discretion to conduct the inquiry sua sponte.206 Sanctions are typically 
discretionary as well, although the rule sets out some limits on this 
discretion.207 
The PSLRA took aim at the discretionary nature of Rule 11. Under the 
PSLRA, courts must conduct a Rule 11 inquiry upon the final adjudication of 
every securities class action.208 They must also make specific findings on the 
record regarding the compliance of the parties and the attorneys with the 
rule.209 Finally, if the court determines that a party or attorney violated Rule 
11, it must impose sanctions.210 As a result, in securities class actions, both the 
inquiry and the award of sanctions are mandatory. 
The PSLRA is the only federal statute to modify Rule 11 in this way. Yet 
many scholars have argued for greater use of Rule 11 and its statutory 
counterparts to combat frivolous litigation in other areas of the law. Some 
scholars have argued, for example, that judges should make greater use of 35 
U.S.C. § 285, which allows the court to award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing 
party in exceptional patent cases.211 Congress has also experimented with 
different versions of Rule 11, including a version that was effective between 
1983 and 1993 that made sanctions mandatory under certain 
circumstances.212 
At first glance, this enhanced role for Rule 11 has promise in addressing 
meritless litigation fueled by cost asymmetries. Like heightened pleading and 
fee shifting, it gives plaintiffs a greater incentive to screen their claims at the 
outset of the case. It also allows for the possibility that a case may have merit 
even if the plaintiff does not know all of the relevant facts at the outset. As a 
 
 205.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)–(3). 
 206.  Id. R. 11(c)(2)–(3). 
 207.  Id. R. 11(c)(1), (4)–(5). 
 208.  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(c) (2012). 
 209.  Id. § 78u–4(c)(1). 
 210.  Id. § 78u–4(c)(2). 
 211.  See, e.g., Liang & Berliner, supra note 12, at 66 (arguing that, “to discourage frivolous 
patent cases, fee shifting should be used more liberally under section 285 in cases where the 
merits are clear”). 
 212.  See Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1007,  
1010–12 (1999) (explaining the amendments to Rule 11).  
A2_ERICKSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2016  8:26 PM 
2016] HEIGHTENED PROCEDURE 105 
result, mandatory Rule 11 sanctions could allow the filing of meritorious cases 
that heightened pleading rules might screen out. Finally, the mandatory 
nature of the inquiries addresses the risk of underdeterrence that exists under 
the current version of Rule 11. Under this version, litigants know that their 
opponents may not bother to file a Rule 11 motion and that courts may award 
little or no sanctions, undercutting the rule’s utility. A mandatory rule would 
increase the deterrent effect of the rule. 
Yet the reality of mandatory Rule 11 reviews has not matched their 
promise. Todd Henderson and William Hubbard recently examined over a 
thousand securities class actions to determine whether the presiding judges 
complied with their Rule 11 obligations.213 They found that judges conducted 
Rule 11 inquiries in only 14% of securities class actions.214 In other words, 
despite the statutory obligation to conduct a Rule 11 inquiry at the end of 
every securities class action, judges rarely do. 215 
This finding is not entirely surprising. Many judges may not be aware of 
their obligation to conduct a Rule 11 inquiry in securities class actions. Used 
to the discretionary nature of Rule 11 in other federal cases, judges may not 
know that Congress eliminated their discretion in securities class actions, 
especially if they rarely handle these cases.216 And the parties may not want to 
remind the court, especially if the case settles. Few defendants will want to risk 
upending the deal by asking for a Rule 11 inquiry. They may simply be glad 
that the fight is over and may not want to spend more time and money on an 
uncertain sanctions battle. 
Additionally, even judges who know about their Rule 11 obligations 
under the PSLRA may not want to prolong the case. Most securities class 
actions settle, and most proposed orders accompanying these settlement 
agreements include boilerplate language stating that the parties have 
complied with Rule 11.217 Judges may believe that they can comply with their 
own Rule 11 obligations by simply signing the orders. Moreover, judicial 
dockets are so full that judges may not feel that they have the luxury of looking 
for fights where there are none. And just as judges are hesitant to order fee 
shifting even when they are statutorily allowed to do so,218 judges may also not 
 
 213.  See generally Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 14.  
 214.  See id. at S90.  
 215.  See id. Two more limited studies reached the same conclusion. See Stephen J. Choi & 
Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers, Changes During the First Decade After the 
PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1506 (2006); Wendy Gerwick Couture, Remarks, Around the 
World of Securities Fraud in Eighty Motions to Dismiss, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 553, 567 (2014).  
 216.  See Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 14, at S93 (“Federal district court judges are 
generalists, and it is probable that the minutiae of a specialty area, like securities law, are beyond 
the ken of the average judge.”).  
 217.  See id. at S93, S99 (finding that most of the Rule 11 inquiries conducted by courts occur 
in the settlement context in which “the effort involved is minimal” and the judge can get away 
with “boilerplate findings”). 
 218.  See supra notes 166–73. 
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be very interested in ordering sanctions under Rule 11. 
The PSLRA is just one example of a mandatory sanctions rule, but it does 
demonstrate that such sanctions are not the most effective tool to combat 
meritless litigation. Given the promise of heightened pleading and fee 
shifting, lawmakers may be better served by using these tools rather than 
placing their faith in altered versions of Rule 11. 
C. REDUCING HYBRID ASYMMETRIES 
Cases with both information and cost asymmetries present the most 
difficult procedural challenges. In these hybrid cases, lawmakers cannot 
simply choose from the traditional menu of procedural tools because many 
of these tools alleviate one type of asymmetry while exacerbating the other. 
As a result, lawmakers need to be more creative in devising procedural 
solutions to apply in this subset of cases. This Subpart first explains why many 
traditional procedural tools are not appropriate in cases with both 
information and cost asymmetries. It then turns to ways that lawmakers can 
combine procedural tools to simultaneously address both types of 
asymmetries. 
1. Ineffective Procedural Tools 
The traditional menu of procedural tools does not work in hybrid cases. 
Most procedural tools target only one type of asymmetry, and, in doing so, 
risk intensifying the other asymmetry. As a result, traditional procedural tools 
can make the problems in hybrid cases even worse, exacerbating the dynamics 
that lead to meritless litigation in the first place. 
Pre-suit discovery illustrates this point. As explained in Subpart III.A, pre-
suit discovery is a promising solution in information asymmetric cases because it 
gives plaintiffs access to the information they need to evaluate their claims.219 
In cost asymmetric cases, however, pre-suit discovery would make the cost 
asymmetry worse by forcing defendants to incur discovery costs before they 
have the opportunity to file a motion to dismiss.220 As a result, allowing pre-
suit discovery in cases with both information and cost asymmetries would offer 
some information advantages to plaintiffs, but would also increase the cost 
imbalance between the parties. 
Heightened pleading presents the opposite problem. Heightened 
pleading rules can be appropriate in cost asymmetric cases because these rules 
make it more difficult for plaintiffs to exploit a cost asymmetry by filing a 
meritless lawsuit.221 Yet, heightened pleading would have a deleterious effect 
on information asymmetric cases because the plaintiffs in these cases do not 
 
 219.  See supra Part III.A.1.i. 
 220.  See supra Part III.B.2.i. 
 221.  See supra Part III.B.1.i. 
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have access to the information they need to evaluate their claims.222 Forcing 
plaintiffs to plead information they do not have will keep them out of court 
regardless of the merits of their claims. 
As these examples demonstrate, the most common tools for procedural 
reform work for one category of cases, but not the other. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that most of heightened procedures described as good options for 
information asymmetric cases are listed as bad options for cost asymmetric 
cases, and vice versa. This state of affairs makes it especially difficult to address 
hybrid information/cost asymmetric cases. 
This point has implications in the legislative arena. Lawmakers often 
choose procedural tools appropriate for cost asymmetric cases even if the 
targeted lawsuits have both cost and information asymmetries.223 The tools 
used in cost asymmetric cases help lawmakers appear tough on frivolous 
litigation. In contrast, the tools used in information asymmetric cases make it 
easier for plaintiffs to pursue their claims—a politically unpopular outcome 
in many areas of the law. These political dynamics mean that lawmakers run 
the risk of overemphasizing cost asymmetries, while underemphasizing 
information asymmetries. 
This risk is more problematic than it may first appear. In focusing on cost 
asymmetries to the exclusion of information asymmetries, lawmakers are not 
solving half of the problem. Instead, they are exacerbating the problem in 
significant ways because the solutions designed to address the cost 
asymmetries will typically increase information asymmetries. As a result, 
lawmakers who focus only on cost asymmetries may well increase the number 
of plaintiffs with meritorious claims who cannot make it through the 
courthouse doors. 
2. Effective Procedural Tools 
How then can lawmakers promote litigation reform in this particularly 
challenging category of cases? Ideally, the legal system would find a way to 
give plaintiffs more information about the merits of their claims without 
increasing the defendants’ relative litigation costs. This task is harder than it 
sounds. Providing plaintiffs with more information about their claims 
necessarily involves costs, and, under normal procedural rules, these costs are 
typically borne by defendants. This Subpart examines three ways to address 
this challenge. In doing so, the discussion builds on the detailed examination 
of specific heightened procedures in prior Parts, allowing this Subpart to 
focus on ways to combine heightened procedural tools to address hybrid 
 
 222.  See supra Part III.A.2.i. 
 223.  See infra Part IV.B (discussing legislative efforts targeting securities class actions). 
Lawmakers may also prefer cost asymmetric tools because these tools are generally cheaper for 
the government. Setting up an administrative review scheme to provide plaintiffs with more 
information about their claims imposes greater costs on the government than heightened 
pleading requirements or fee-shifting rules.  
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asymmetries. 
The first way to address hybrid cases is to make plaintiffs bear the costs of 
increased access to information. Lawmakers, for example, could allow 
plaintiffs access to pre-suit discovery, but only if they are willing to pay for it. 
This proposal would be subject to the caveats about pre-suit discovery and cost 
shifting addressed in the prior Parts. Any pre-suit discovery, for example, 
should be subject to strict limits so the defendants do not have to open their 
files upon only the barest of suspicions.224 The rules would also have to be 
crafted in such a way that they could not be watered down by well-intentioned 
judges hesitant to shift costs to plaintiffs.225 And in class actions, it would need 
to be structured to place the costs on attorneys or insurance companies rather 
than class members to avoid deterring these suits altogether.226 
Even with these safeguards, requiring plaintiffs to pay for early access to 
discovery raises some concerns. Under this regime, plaintiffs who cannot 
afford to pay for pre-suit discovery will find it more difficult to survive a motion 
to dismiss compared to plaintiffs with deeper pockets. On the other hand, 
under current rules, all plaintiffs in cases involving information asymmetries 
have difficulty surviving a motion to dismiss. A procedural regime in which at 
least some of these plaintiffs make it through the courthouse doors is arguably 
an improvement, even if not all plaintiffs are able to take advantage of this 
new procedural option. 
An alternative way to address hybrid cases is to make the parties share the 
costs of increased access to information. Under this approach, lawmakers 
could allow the plaintiff to obtain limited discovery before filing, but only if 
the plaintiff agreed to pay a specified percentage of the defendants’ costs in 
providing this discovery. Any subsequent discovery after the case is filed would 
be subject to the normal rule that each side pays its own discovery costs. This 
approach would reduce concerns about access to justice because the plaintiff 
would not have to incur the entire cost of early discovery. It would not 
eliminate these concerns, however, especially if the plaintiffs’ share of the 
costs is significant. 
A third and final way to address hybrid cases is for the government to pay 
the costs associated with early access to information, either through 
administrative screening of cases or by direct funding of pre-suit discovery 
costs. Administrative review is proposed above in both information and cost 
asymmetric cases, although in different forms. In information asymmetric 
cases, the administrative agency charged with reviewing the claims must have 
the power to investigate the claims by conducting interviews and obtaining 
relevant documents.227 In cost asymmetric cases, the agency must be able to 
 
 224.  See supra Part III.A.1.i. 
 225.  See supra Part III.B.1.ii. 
 226.  See supra Part III.B.1.ii.b. 
 227.  See supra Part III.A.1.ii. 
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review claims in a cost effective manner so as not to exacerbate the existing 
financial incentives of the litigation.228 In cases that include both information 
and cost asymmetries, agency review must thread the needle of both models. 
The agency must be able to get the information that it needs without 
worsening the cost asymmetries. 
Lawmakers could accomplish this goal by using government funds to pay 
for limited investigation of the plaintiffs’ claims. Some states have funded 
agency review in the past, but this funding is usually limited to the cost of the 
agency’s own investigation.229 It generally does not compensate the parties for 
their own costs of complying with the investigation, and it is unclear whether 
this approach would be politically palatable. It remains a promising option, 
however, in areas where plaintiffs are unable to pay for some or all of the pre-
suit discovery costs. 
In sum, heightened procedure can help address meritless litigation, but 
only if lawmakers target their legislative efforts to the specific causes of the 
meritless claims. In information asymmetric cases, lawmakers should adopt 
heightened procedural tools that give plaintiffs more information about their 
claims. In cost asymmetric cases, lawmakers should use tools that rebalance 
the cost of litigation between the parties. And in hybrid cases involving both 
information and cost asymmetries, lawmakers should combine heightened 
procedural tools to give plaintiffs more information about the merits of their 
claims without exacerbating the cost asymmetry between the parties. As we 
will now see, this conceptual framework has implications for procedural 
reform on the ground. 
IV.     HEIGHTENED PROCEDURE IN ACTION: THREE CASE STUDIES 
This Part explores how heightened procedure can work in practice. It 
first describes how lawmakers in Massachusetts used effective heightened 
procedural tools to reform medical malpractice laws. It then explains how 
Congress used ineffective heightened procedural tools to reform the 
procedures governing federal securities class actions. Finally, it provides 
guidance for lawmakers who are currently evaluating proposed procedural 
changes in patent litigation. 
A. THE USE OF PROCEDURE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION 
Few types of litigation have experienced as much procedural reform as 
medical malpractice litigation. Nearly every state has adopted procedural 
reforms to help screen medical malpractice lawsuits.230 In a number of states, 
 
 228.  See supra Part III.B.1.v. 
 229.  See, e.g., V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 27 § 166i(d)(3) (2015) (providing that the government will 
pay for certain investigatory costs incurred by medical malpractice screening panels). 
 230.  See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, The Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in 
Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 945 (2004) (surveying state reforms related 
to medical malpractice litigation).  
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injured patients must convince a panel of state-appointed experts that they 
have a viable case.231 In other jurisdictions, patients must obtain a certificate 
from a doctor verifying that their claim likely has merit before they can 
proceed to court.232 Lawmakers also continue to explore additional reforms, 
including caps on damages and mandatory arbitration.233 These reform 
efforts have even gotten federal attention, with President Obama stating in 
his State of the Union speech in 2011 that he was open to “medical 
malpractice reform to rein in frivolous lawsuits.”234 
Yet the problem is more complicated than President Obama and others 
have recognized. The problem is not that too many patients are filing 
malpractice claims, but rather that the wrong patients are filing malpractice 
claims. A landmark study by the Harvard Medical School demonstrated this 
point.235 Researchers examined the medical files from all of the medical 
malpractice lawsuits filed over a one-year period in the state of New York.236 
Although all of the plaintiffs alleged negligence by a medical professional, the 
researchers determined that less than 20% of the lawsuits actually arose from 
negligence.237 This data suggests that many plaintiffs were filing 
nonmeritorious cases. 
Just as striking, however, was their analysis of a selection of hospital 
records from New York hospitals during this same time period. This analysis 
uncovered hundreds of additional incidents in which patients were injured by 
the negligence of a doctor or nurse. Almost none of these incidents resulted 
in litigation.238 Based on this data, researchers concluded that medical 
malpractice suffers from a “tort gap.”239 Patients and their lawyers too often 
do a poor job of determining when to sue—they sue too often when they do 
not have a meritorious claim, and too seldom when they do have a meritorious 
claim. 
One likely explanation for this gap is that many patients lack the 
 
 231.  See id. 
 232.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1(a)(3) (2015); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(b) (2002 & 
Supp. 2015). 
 233.  See, e.g., Kyle Miller, Note, Putting the Caps on Caps: Reconciling the Goal of Medical Malpractice 
Reform with the Twin Objectives of Tort Law, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1473 (2006) (“Probably the most 
popular version of medical malpractice reform since the medical malpractice insurance crisis of the 
1970s has been caps on jury awards.”); see also id. 1482 (“Another popular method of tort reform in 
medical malpractice cases has been the use of state-sponsored arbitration or screening 
panels.”(citation omitted)). 
 234.  President Barack H. Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
State of the Union (Jan. 25, 2011). 
 235.  See generally PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, 
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993).  
 236.  See generally id.  
 237.  See id. at 71. 
 238.  See id. at 71–73. 
 239.  See id.  
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information necessary to determine when they have a meritorious claim. The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act requires medical 
providers to provide patients with a copy of their medical records within 30 
days of receiving a request for such records.240 This statute is helpful to 
patients if the information they need is contained within their medical 
records, but not if key evidence lies only in the recollections of doctors or 
nurses or in other files. Without a chance to question their medical providers, 
many patients will be unable to fully understand what caused their injuries.241 
As a result, the goal of any reforms in this area should not be simply to 
rein in frivolous litigation. Instead, it should be to better sort the good cases 
from the bad, such that patients injured by negligence receive appropriate 
compensation while doctors who do not commit malpractice are protected 
from meritless lawsuits. 
Massachusetts has tried to do just that. In 2012, Massachusetts passed 
comprehensive health care reform legislation, which aims in part to improve 
communication between patients and their doctors after an unexpected 
medical outcome.242 Under this law, health care providers must disclose to 
patients when unanticipated adverse outcomes occur.243 They must also 
investigate and explain to the patient what happened, establish systems to 
prevent the recurrence of such incidents, and, where appropriate, apologize 
and offer fair financial compensation.244 The law also includes a 180-day 
cooling-off period during which the patient cannot file suit, allowing the 
investigation to occur before the matter goes to court.245 
This law was lauded as a “historic and unprecedented partnership” 
between doctors and attorneys in Massachusetts—two groups that often find 
themselves on opposite sides of any medical malpractice debate.246 The 
cooperation between these two groups started early, with the Massachusetts 
 
 240.  45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2016). States may also have their own statutes requiring medical 
providers to turn over the records within a shorter time period. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 123110 (West 2012)  (requiring a health care provider to provide access to patient 
records within five days of a request and to provide copies of such records within 15 days).  
 241.  See Struve, supra note 230, at 977 (“[T]he data on malpractice lawsuits resolved prior 
to trial are consistent with the view that some malpractice plaintiffs lack information concerning 
the merits of the claim and must sue to obtain it . . . [which] would be true, for example, if 
necessary evidence were contained not just in medical records but also in the recollections of 
those present during a medical procedure.”). 
 242.  See An Act Improving the Quality of Health Care and Reducing Costs through Increased 
Transparency, Efficiency and Innovation, 2012 Mass. Acts ch. 224 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 3–6D (2014)). 
 243.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 79L(b) (2014). 
 244.  Id. ch. 231, § 60L(g). 
 245.  Id. ch. 231, § 60L(a). 
 246.  See Press Release, Massachusetts Bar Association, Massachusetts Medical Society, and 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, Landmark Agreement Between Physicians and Attorneys 
Provides for Medical Liability Reforms in Massachusetts (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.massbar.org/ 
media/1272674/08.07.12%20mba%20mms%20release.pdf. 
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Medical Society, the Massachusetts Bar Association, and the Massachusetts 
Academy of Trial Attorneys all working together to approve the language of 
the bill.247 It was not surprising that the law garnered the support of patients 
and their lawyers because it provided them with access to information that 
they would otherwise lack when evaluating potential claims. Patients no 
longer need to rely on their medical records alone to determine whether they 
have a viable claim. They can instead receive an explanation of what 
happened to them from their own doctors and nurses. This explanation will 
allow them to make a more informed decision regarding the merits of 
potential claims before filing suit. 
Ironically, doctors likely supported this law for many of the same reasons. 
This law tapped into their desire to talk to their patients after an adverse event. 
While they may be nervous about saying too much out of fear that it may be 
used against them in a future lawsuit, they still have the more basic desire to 
talk to their patients and explain what happened.248 Indeed, a hospital system 
that piloted a similar program before Massachusetts passed its law found that 
“the most commonly cited factor supporting the model across constituencies 
is that it was morally and ethically the ‘right thing to do.’”249 In short, the 
Massachusetts law gave doctors and other medical professionals an incentive 
to do what they already want to do: talk to their patients about what had 
happened to them. 
This law was only passed in 2012, and no empirical evidence is available 
yet on its effectiveness. Based on similar voluntary programs adopted at 
hospitals around the country,250 however, researchers expect the number of 
meritless claims to fall.251 Moreover, even plaintiffs with meritorious claims 
may not sue because the Massachusetts statute encourages doctors and 
 
 247.  See id.  
 248.  See Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding Disclosure of 
Medical Errors, 289 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 1001, 1003 (2003) (disclosing the complex feelings of 
doctors following an adverse medical event, but noting that they generally “agreed in principle 
that patients should be told about any error that caused harm” and that “many said such 
disclosure was ethically imperative”).  
 249.  MASS. MED. SOC’Y, A ROADMAP FOR REMOVING BARRIERS TO DISCLOSURE, APOLOGY AND 
OFFER IN MASSACHUSETTS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2012), https://www.massmed.org/Advocacy/ 
State-Advocacy/A-Roadmap-for-Removing-Barriers-to-Disclosure,-Apology-and-Offer-in-Massachusetts-
Executive-Summary-(pdf).  
 250.  See generally Michelle M. Mello & Thomas H. Gallagher, Malpractice Reform—Opportunities 
for Leadership by Health Care Institutions and Liability Insurers, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1353 (2010) 
(describing voluntary disclosure and offer programs around the country).  
 251.  See, e.g., Kelly Bogue, Note, Innovative Cost Control: An Analysis of Medical Malpractice Reform in 
Massachusetts, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 87, 114 (2013) (“If the Cost Bill can reduce the frequency 
of malpractice claims through transparent, open discussion, as well as shrink the costs of the litigation 
through earlier settlement, then there is a very strong possibility the Commonwealth’s overall health 
care costs will be reduced.”(footnote omitted)). These laws are modeled after similar steps taken 
voluntarily by the University of Michigan Health System, which reduced the cost per lawsuit by almost 
50%. See Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and After Implementation of a Medical Error 
Disclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 217 (2010). 
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hospitals to offer injured plaintiffs fair compensation as part of the 
investigatory process. And even if the total amount paid to injured patients 
increases, this money will be channeled toward patients who were actually 
injured as a result of medical malpractice. 
This approach captures the promise of procedural reform in information 
asymmetric cases. Under this new law, patients will have more information 
about their injuries before going to court. Those who learn that their injuries 
were not caused by malpractice will be less likely to file lawsuits, and the claims 
that are filed are far more likely to be meritorious, closing the “tort gap” 
identified in the Harvard Medical School study. 
B. THE MISUSE OF PROCEDURE IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
Congress’s efforts to overhaul securities class actions were not as 
successful in sorting meritorious from nonmeritorious claims. In the early 
1990s, corporate America claimed to be under siege by professional plaintiffs 
who filed frivolous securities claims to extort multi-million dollar 
settlements.252 The problem was described in Congress as a classic case of cost 
asymmetries. One report in the House of Representatives, for example, 
attributed the problem to the fact that “[t]he cost of discovery often forces 
innocent parties to settle frivolous securities class actions.”253 A Senate report 
similarly claimed that securities class actions “are generally settled based not 
on the merits but on the size of the defendant’s pocketbook.”254 Even the 
Chairman of the Securities & Exchange Commission agreed with this 
assessment, stating that “[i]f a corporate defendant is unsuccessful in getting 
a weak case dismissed by an early dispositive motion, the economics of 
litigation may dictate a settlement even if the defendant is relatively confident 
that it would prevail at trial.”255 
In response to these concerns, Congress enacted the PSLRA.256 As 
discussed above, the PSLRA included a variety of heightened procedural 
reforms that directly targeted this cost asymmetry.257 Most significantly, 
Congress imposed heightened pleading requirements for two of the most 
 
 252.  See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of 
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 216, 499–503 (1994) [hereinafter Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin.] (statement of Stephen F. Smith, General Counsel and 
Dir. of Investor Relations, Exabyte Corporation); Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 104th Cong. 39–42 
(1995) (statement of James Kimsey, Chairman, America Online, Inc.). 
 253.  H.R. Rep. No. 104–369, at 37 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).  
 254.  S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 9 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).  
 255.  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin., 103d Cong. 36.  
 256.  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) 
(codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 257.  The PSLRA also included a variety of changes to the substantive securities laws, 
including a safe harbor for certain forward-looking information and limitations on joint and 
several liability. These reforms are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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crucial elements in a securities fraud claim—whether the defendants made a 
false or misleading statement, and whether they acted with the required state 
of mind.258 It also prohibited plaintiffs from obtaining any discovery until after 
they survive a motion to dismiss.259 Finally, as discussed above, the PSLRA 
requires the court to conduct a mandatory Rule 11 inquiry at the end of every 
securities class action.260 If the court concludes that any party or attorney 
violated Rule 11, it must impose sanctions.261 
These heightened procedural reforms all address the cost asymmetry 
between the parties. They did nothing, however, to address the information 
asymmetry between the parties. As detailed in Part III, securities class actions 
are a classic case of both cost and information asymmetries.262 It is true that 
defendants bear a disproportionate share of the discovery costs and thus have 
an economic incentive to settle even meritless cases. At the same time, 
however, plaintiffs in these cases often lack the information they need to 
evaluate the merits of their claims prior to discovery. This is especially true 
when it comes to the element of scienter, which requires plaintiffs to allege 
that the defendants knew what they were saying was false at the time they said 
it. It is extremely difficult for the plaintiff to have evidence creating a “strong 
inference” that the defendant attempted to defraud the company’s investors 
without access to discovery. Yet the procedural reforms of the PSLRA ignored 
this information asymmetry, focusing solely on the cost asymmetry. 
The results were predictable. The PSLRA succeeded in reducing the 
number of nuisance suits, exactly the result that Congress wanted. Yet it also 
eliminated nonfrivolous claims, as several empirical studies have 
demonstrated. One study, for example, examined lawsuits filed both before 
and after the adoption of the PSLRA. The study found that, while the PSLRA 
deterred some suits that would have settled for a nuisance value before the 
PSLRA,263 it also deterred a significant number of suits that would have 
produced a nonnuisance value settlement before the PSLRA.264 In other 
words, the PSLRA has made it harder for shareholders to file both meritorious 
and nonmeritorious claims alike. 
Another study examined IPO-related lawsuits filed both before and after 
 
 258.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–4(b)(1), 78u–4(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 259.  Id. § 78u–4(b)(3)(B). 
 260.  Id. § 78u–4(c)(1). 
 261.  Id. § 78u–4(c)(2).  
 262.  See supra notes 61–69 and accompanying text. 
 263.  Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 64–67 (2009). 
 264.  See id.; see also Eric Talley & Gudrun Johnsen, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation and 
Securities Litigation 4 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch., Olin Research Paper No. 04-7, USC CLEO Research 
Paper No. C04-4, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=536963 (presenting 
data “that even if the PSLRA reduced frivolous litigation (as its proponents claim), it likely deterred 
meritorious litigation as well, and in such proportions as to swamp the deterring effects on non-
meritorious suits”). 
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the PSLRA.265 The study found that shareholders are now significantly less 
likely to file a securities class action in situations in which there is no hard 
evidence of fraud, such as a restatement or SEC investigation.266 Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys have shifted their attention toward cases where the presence of such 
hard evidence makes it easier for them to survive a motion to dismiss.267 The 
study concludes that “[t]he PSLRA operated less like a selective deterrence 
against fraud and more as a simple tax on all litigation (including meritorious 
suits).”268 
What then should Congress have done differently back in 1995? First, it 
should have recognized that the problem was not simply one of cost 
asymmetries. It was likely true that the defendants’ high discovery costs made 
it possible for some plaintiffs to extract settlements in meritless cases. But that 
does not mean that the answer was to adopt reforms that only targeted this 
cost asymmetry. Lawmakers should also have been on the lookout for 
information asymmetries that made heightened pleading and mandatory 
Rule 11 inquiries, at least on their own, inappropriate—exacerbating one 
asymmetry in the name of reducing another. 
Second, after recognizing that securities class actions include both 
information and cost asymmetries, Congress should have adopted procedural 
reforms that were better suited to such hybrid cases. For example, Congress 
could have adopted heightened pleading for certain elements, but allowed 
plaintiffs limited pre-suit discovery on these elements at their own expense. 
Alternatively, it could have allowed pre-suit discovery at the defendants’ 
expense and then imposed fee shifting on the plaintiffs if they chose to go 
forward with their claims but were ultimately unsuccessful. 
Both of these procedural options would have allowed plaintiffs to get 
more information about their claims before filing suit, but only if they were 
willing to put their own money on the line. As discussed above, requiring 
plaintiffs to pay for pre-suit discovery costs may raise concerns about access to 
justice—only those able to pay for discovery would get it.269 On the other 
hand, this option would still give plaintiffs more options than they have today. 
The PSLRA in its current form forces plaintiffs to run the gauntlet of 
heightened pleading armed only with information they can access prior to 
discovery. Allowing pre-suit discovery at the plaintiffs’ expense would give 
plaintiffs with meritorious claims a far better chance of surviving a motion to 
dismiss. 
 
 265.  See generally Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598 (2007).  
 266.  See id. at 622. 
 267.  See id. at 601, 622.  
 268.  Id. at 623.  
 269.  See supra Part III.C.1. 
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C. THE PROCEDURAL DEBATE IN PATENT LITIGATION 
If there was ever an area ripe for procedural reform, it is patent law. 
Between 2000 and 2013, the number of patent cases more than doubled.270 
Proponents of reform place the blame for this increase on nonpracticing 
entities (“NPEs”)—so-called patent trolls—that obtain patents, but do not 
develop or sell products using the patented inventions.271 Over the past 
several years, NPEs have filed more than half of all patent cases,272 and these 
cases have attracted scorn.273 On the whole, cases filed by NPEs are less likely 
to result in a verdict for the plaintiff than patent infringement cases filed by 
other types of plaintiffs.274 Moreover, there is a wide disparity in the average 
damages awarded to NPEs compared to other plaintiffs who file patent 
infringement claims, potentially reflecting the reduced merit of these 
claims.275 
Many members of Congress agree. Representative Robert Goodlatte, a 
chief proponent of patent reform, recently stated that the patent system has 
become a “playground for litigation extortion and frivolous claims.”276 
Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated 
that patent reform has become a “little oasis” of bipartisanship as a result of 
NPEs that “prey on innocent businesses.”277 And President Obama has echoed 
these concerns, stating in his 2014 State of the Union address that the United 
States needs new patent reform legislation to “allow[] our businesses to stay 
focused on innovation, not costly, needless litigation.”278 
The consensus among many lawmakers is that numerous cases filed by 
 
 270.  See CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION 
STUDY 5 (2014), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-
patent- litigation-study.pdf.  
 271.  See, e.g., Press Release, 50 Organizations Send Letter to Congressional Leadership Urging 
Solutions to Patent Abuse (July 17, 2013), http://www.patentfairness.org/media/press/50-
organizations-send-letter-to-congressional-leadership-urging-solutions-to-patent-abuse. 
 272.  See RPX CORP., 2015 NPE ACTIVITY: HIGHLIGHTS 4 (2016), http://www.rpxcorp.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/01/RPX-2015-NPE-Activity-Highlights-FinalZ.pdf.  
 273.  See infra notes 276–78; BARRY ET AL., supra note 270, at 11 (presenting data that NPEs 
prevail in litigation significantly less than practicing entities, a trend that has increased over the 
past several years)..  
 274.  See BARRY ET AL., supra note 270, at 11. 
 275.  See id. at 19. This difference in damages may also reflect that NPEs: (1) bring different 
types of claims than other plaintiffs; and (2) cannot collect lost profits and thus have to fall back 
on less lucrative forms of calculating damages. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits 
from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 656–57 (2009).  
 276.  159 CONG. REC. H7511 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 2013) (Statement of Rep. Goodlatte).  
 277.  Mario Trujillo, Grassley: Congress Should Act ‘Decisively’ on Patent Reform, THE HILL (Mar. 
18, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/236074-grassley-congress-should-
act-decisively-on-patent-reform.  
 278.  President Barack H. Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
State of the Union (Jan. 28, 2014). 
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NPEs fall into the cost asymmetric model.279 One House Report, for example, 
explained that “the high cost of mounting a defense to a complaint of patent 
infringement can force a defendant to settle the case and pay the plaintiff—
even when the defendant has good reason to believe that it would have 
prevailed at trial,” giving NPEs an “economic advantage over the targeted 
defendants.”280 Other legislators criticized the “extortion racket” and 
“nationwide protection racket” in these suits.281 Academics have similarly 
attributed the problem to a cost imbalance between the parties, explaining to 
Congress that NPEs “can sue, threaten to impose large discovery costs that 
overwhelmingly fall on the accused infringer, and . . . extract settlements from 
their targets that primarily reflect a desire to avoid the cost of fighting.”282 
Lawmakers heard these complaints loud and clear. Since the beginning 
of 2014, members of Congress have introduced more than a dozen bills to 
reform patent litigation.283 Although many of these bills propose substantive 
changes to the law,284 many also propose procedural reforms, including 
heightened pleading requirements,285 fee shifting,286 restrictions on 
discovery,287 expanded joinder rules,288 and mandatory Rule 11 inquiries.289 
In short, procedure is proving to be a key weapon in Congress’s fight against 
abusive patent litigation. 
At first glance, Congress appears to be on the right track. As detailed 
above in Subpart III.B, cost asymmetric lawsuits are best addressed by reforms 
that rebalance litigation costs between the parties.290 Many of the reforms 
currently on the table do just that. Heightened pleading requires plaintiffs to 
 
 279.  These cases may also be motivated by a lack of information about the validity of the 
patents. See, e.g., La Belle, supra note 194, at 405 (“A common observation about patent litigation 
is that it is unpredictable.”). Construing patents is notoriously difficult, and two different judges 
may well interpret a patent in very different ways. Accordingly, even a low quality patent may be 
upheld as covering the defendant’s products. 
 280.  H.R. REP. NO. 113-279, at 21 (2013).  
 281.  159 CONG. REC. H7519 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 2013) (Statement of Rep. DeFazio). 
 282.  159 CONG. REC. H7519 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 2013) (Letter to Members of the United 
States Congress from Professors in Support of Patent Reform Legislation).  
 283.  See Patent Progress’s Guide to Patent Reform Legislation, supra note 18.  
 284.  See, e.g., Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth Patents Act of 
2015, S. 632, 114th Cong. § 102 (amending the burden of proof to challenge the validity of a 
patent); Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters Act of 2015, H.R. 2045, 114th Cong. § 2 (making 
it unlawful to send patent demand letters in bad faith).  
 285.  See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013); Patent Litigation and 
Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. § 2; Protecting American Talent and 
Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act of 2015, S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 3; Patent Abuse Reduction 
Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013). 
 286.  See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); S. 1137, § 7; S. 1013, § 5. 
 287.  See, e.g., H.R. 3309, § 3; H.R. 2639, § 5; S. 1137, § 5; S. 1013, § 4. 
 288.  See, e.g., H.R. 3309, § 3; H.R. 2639, § 3; S. 1013, § 3.  
 289.  See, e.g., H.R. 2639, § 6. 
 290.  See supra Part III.B.  
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put in time investigating their claims and drafting more detailed 
complaints.291 Fee-shifting rules give plaintiffs more skin in the game in cases 
where most of the costs would otherwise rest on their opponents.292 Discovery 
stays prevent plaintiffs from serving expensive discovery requests before they 
have established the legal sufficiency of their claims.293 And mandatory Rule 
11 inquiries, although likely less effective than other possible reforms,294 
increase the likelihood of sanctions on plaintiffs who file meritless cases. 
Moreover, at least some of these bills have taken pains to avoid creating 
an information asymmetry. Several bills, for example, allow plaintiffs to avoid 
the heightened pleading requirements if the information necessary to comply 
with these requirements is not reasonably accessible to them.295 In these 
circumstances, plaintiffs can instead allege the information more generally 
and include a statement in the complaint as to why the more specific 
information is not accessible. This provision may keep patent reform from 
falling prey to some of the problems that have plagued securities class actions. 
Despite these advantages, however, the current bills in Congress may go 
too far. The Innovation Act, which has garnered significant support in the 
House of Representatives, includes a multitude of different procedural 
reforms, including heightened pleading, cost-sharing in discovery, loser-pays 
rules, and stays on discovery.296 The PATENT Act, which has broad support in 
the Senate, includes similar provisions.297 In other words, rather than 
targeting meritless cases through one or two procedural reforms, the most 
popular proposals unleash a broad arsenal of procedural tools.298 It is fair to 
ask whether it might make more sense to see if more limited reforms would 
work before enacting such a sweeping set of reforms. 
Moreover, these changes come at the same time that the judicial branch 
is strengthening its existing procedural tools in two important ways. First, the 
Supreme Court recently re-interpreted a federal statute, 35 U.S.C. § 285, 
which (as discussed in Subpart III.B) allows district courts to award attorneys’ 
fees to the prevailing party in “exceptional” patent infringement cases. 
Although the Federal Circuit had previously held that courts could only use 
 
 291.  See supra Part III.B.1.i. 
 292.  See supra Part III.B.1.ii. 
 293.  See supra Part III.B.1.iv. 
 294.  See supra notes 216–217. 
 295.  See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015); Protecting American 
Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act of 2015, S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 3. 
 296.  See H.R. 3309, § 3. 
 297.  See, e.g., S. 1137, §§ 3, 5, 7. 
 298.  In general, the use of multiple heightened procedures should have a greater impact than 
the use of a single procedure on its own. In some instances, the procedures will complement one 
another, as with the heightened pleading requirements and stay of discovery under the PSLRA. In 
other instances, the procedures will act as two, independent hurdles that plaintiffs must overcome, such 
as heightened pleading combined with fee shifting. Given the possibility of an additive effect, 
lawmakers should be cautious about piling on too many heightened procedural tools.  
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this statute to award fees under fairly limited circumstances,299 more recently, 
the Supreme Court interpreted the statute more broadly, giving district courts 
greater flexibility in combating meritless patent claims.300 This new 
interpretation has been in place for less than two years, so its effectiveness 
remains to be seen. 
Second, at the same time that it is strengthening sanctions law, the 
judiciary is also making it more difficult to survive a motion to dismiss in 
patent suits. In Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court purported to raise 
pleading standards across the board in all federal civil cases.301 A small 
category of these cases, however, remained largely untouched because they 
were covered by the official forms attached to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.302 Form 18, for instance, allowed plaintiffs in patent infringement 
cases to survive a motion to dismiss as long as they included a few barebones 
allegations.303 As a result, the pleading requirements in patent infringement 
cases have been less stringent than in most other federal cases.304 Just recently, 
however, the Supreme Court abolished the official forms, including Form 
18.305 Accordingly, plaintiffs in patent infringement cases now face the same 
pleading requirements as plaintiffs in other federal cases.306 
These steps should prompt Congress to tread lightly. Heightened procedure 
is unnecessary when the transsubstantive rules are capable of addressing the 
problems. In patent law, the transsubstantive pleading rules, as newly interpreted 
in Twombly and Iqbal, have had little chance to impact filing patterns. And the 
increased sanctions in section 285 have recently been given new life. Congress 
should give these rules an opportunity to address the problems in patent litigation 
before imposing additional procedural hurdles. If these rules prove insufficient, 
Congress should then consider further procedures, such as heightened pleading 
or cost shifting, that are targeted to the cost asymmetries in this area. 
In sum, the three case studies in this Part highlight the promise and the peril 
 
 299.  Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  
 300.  Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014).  
 301.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 554–57 (2007). 
 302.  See In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that whether a plaintiff’s complaint “adequately plead[s] direct 
infringement is to be measured by the specificity required by Form 18”). 
 303.  See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 18 (abrogated Dec. 1, 2015). 
 304.  See, e.g., Yoonhee Kim, Note, Reconciling Twombly and Patent Pleadings Beyond the Text of Form 
18, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 511, 523–25 (2014) (explaining the impact of Bill of Lading).  
 305.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (abrogated Dec. 1, 2015).  
 306.  These judicial actions, both with respect to section 285 and Form 18, may well have 
been influenced by calls for reform in the legislative arena. As scholars have demonstrated, the 
judicial and legislative branches often engage in a dialogue in which the judiciary responds to 
legislative calls for reform by changing their interpretation of existing law. See generally J. Jonas 
Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (2014) (discussing how the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit shapes patent law). 
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of heightened procedure. In each of these areas, the causes of meritless claims 
are different—medical malpractice involves information asymmetries, patent 
litigation includes cost asymmetries, and securities class actions involve a 
combination of the two. Yet these examples all reveal a common lesson. When 
lawmakers open the heightened procedural toolbox, they must take pains to 
choose tools that match the specific challenges at issue. This lesson may well have 
future repercussions. Congress has not yet decided what steps to take in patent 
litigation, but its actions in this area may provide a springboard to legislative 
action in other areas of the law, including products liability and mass torts. In 
each area, lawmakers have the power to use heightened procedure to sort the 
good cases from the bad, but only if they heed the lessons of their past reforms. 
V.     CONCLUSION 
Just as not all meritless litigation is created equal, nor are all heightened 
procedural tools. Some tools address information asymmetries, others address 
cost asymmetries, and still others address a combination of the two. Heightened 
procedure allows lawmakers to take account of these differences, tailoring 
procedural rules to the problems in specific areas of the law. At the same time, 
however, heightened procedure places a special burden on lawmakers to 
understand the specific problems in these areas and target their procedural 
solutions accordingly. Only through this careful targeting can heightened 
procedure fix the problems that uniform rules leave unsolved. In the end, 
meritless litigation is not uniform, and the procedures to address it should not be 
either. 
 
